Nations on the Mohawk is excepted. sturdy colonists whose aim was to win farms from the wild woods would have no stipendaries or useless mouths to feed, and therefore the Aborigines were fain to take part with the Canadians who did not care to clear farms and who would give them powder, arms and lead, gaudy blankets and rum for their furs -who intermarried amongst them did not laugh at their actions but dressed in blankets and with even paint on their faces—trod the scalp dance and feested at the dog sacrifice. When the drapeau blanc of the Bourbons disappeared from the flag-staff of the last fortlet in the Western wilds, the Indian found himself no longer of consequence; scouted at by his conquerors, his yearly stipond withhold, without the great necessaries of life—ammunition, numbers of hem perished with hunger during the win-ters of 1761-62, and the survivors nurished a vengeance deep and strong against their oppressors.
The fur trade had been wholly destroyed

by the war, no arrangements were yet made for its restoration, and those whose principal means of life it was suffered fearfully in consequence; in fact the English occupation of Canada was literally placed over a political volcano whose explosion threatened to inflict

terrible calamities on all parties.

Ever since Britain became a power in the civilized world it has been one of her distinguishing characteristics that whatever her hand had grasped no force could make her relinquish again, and how the Imperial race that people her Empire have been brought to the verge of destruction only to hurl back on their foes with accummulated power the fate prepared for themselves and to establish more firmly the sway which negligence engendered by consciousness of might imperiled. But many circumstances tended to postpone the inevitable contest and to permit the harrassed colonies to repose in a sullen apathy which was to know

an awful awaking.

General Amherst was busily engaged in organizing an expedition against the Island of Martinique, in the West Indies, where Liopson so disgracefully failed in 1759. The troops were to be assembled at Barbadoes, and to consist of the greater part of those who had recently achieved the conquest of Canada, and were placed under the command of Major General Monckton. Owing to the difficulties attendent on navigation in those days, it was the 14th December before the whole expedition was concentrated at Carlisle bay. A great deal of time was ex-pended in reconnoitering and obtaining reliable intelligence of the anchorage and landing places on the Island; in the mean-time a detachment and squadron was de tailed for that service early in June, and obtained possession thereof without opposi tion. At length, on 7th January, 1762, the expedition sailed for its destination, and on the 8th arrived off Martinique, and on the 10th a landing was effected at l'Ance-darlet, on the south shore of the island, and on the 15th January a general disembarkation took place without loss at Cas du Naviares (westward of St. Pierre. the chief town,) and at the place where General Hopson landed in 1759, and after some fighting the town and citadel of Fort Royal capitulated on the 4th February—this was followed by the capitulation of the south side of the island except St. Pierre on the 7th February. It being deemed necessary to reduce the north side of the island Captain Harvey of the Dragen and a squadron sailed for the port of La Trinite, and on the 9th captured the Fort and town, whereupon the whole of the north side capitulated which was followed by the

surrender of St. Pierre and capitulation of the whole island on the 13th February. The island of St. Lusia was surrendered to a squadron under the command of Hon. A. Harvy on the 26th February, who was about attempting the conquest of St. Vincent, but was provented by an express announcing the fact that Spain had declared war against Great Britain and that a combined Spanish and French fleet menaced the safety of A concentration of the British fleet off Port Royal, in that island, led to the discovery that the French fleet under M. de Blenac having on board 2,000 troops appeared off Martinique on the 9th March, but finding the island already in possession of the British they steered for Port St. Francois in the island of Hispanich, when it was quickly blockaded by a squadron under the command of Captain Harvy so effectually that nothing further was heard of them

during the campaign.

In order to cripple the resources of Spain it was resolved to strike a blow at the principal American possessions, and for this purpose a large armament was fitted out igainst the city of Havana, in the Island of Cuba, the port at which her trans Atlantic trade centred and the seat of her chief naval power in America. The city of Havana possesses the most complete land locked harbor in the world, its entrance is about one mile in length and not above 1000 feet in width with deep water close up to the shores, i expands into a large basin 21 miles at length from east to west, and about 3 miles from north to south, depth of water varying from 21 to 6 fathoms—in general outlines the shape of the harbor would resemble the out lines of a wool pack considerably exaggerated at the corners. Havana is situated on the south side of the channel and west side At the period of the siege it of the ha ' or. was about a mile and a quarter in length and three-quarters of a mile in width. It was placed at the south-east end of the channel. This channel was defended on the north-western entrance by the Castle of the Moro, built upon a narrow point of land with sufficient accommodations for a garrison of 1000 men. It was an irregular pentagonal work considerably elongated the apex of the figure towards the entrance to the harbor, and connected at the eastern angle into a stone fort mounting 12 guns, called the Apostles Battery, which covered a boom stretching from the Peinta Fort on the south side to the north shore below the battery. The base of the pentagon had two bastions at the angles, which, with the connecting curtain, mounted 17 pieces of artillery a short distance above the Apostles Battery. Another work called the Shephord's Battery was constructed; it was altogether detached, commanded the boom and channel in which the enemy had sunk two large vessels to impede the passage inside the boom and bring any vessels attempting it under the guns of the fort and batteries on both shores. To the northward along the sea shore a stone redoubt protected a deep ditch covering the base of the pentagon.

This last completed the defences of the north shore, except a fleating battery and the vessels of the Spanish fleet; but on the south, the Peinta Fort before mentioned, a square work with bastions at the corners stood on the angle formed by the entrance channel; it was entirely detached from the enciente of the town which consisted of a chain of ten bastions connected by nine curtains. Commencing at the water's edge 500 yards east of Fort Peints and continued to the water's edge on the south side of the hasin, an indifferent covered way and six counterguards in front of the bastions,

formed the whole defences on this side except a half moon, or rather horse shoe redoubt on Gonzalo's hill across the inlet at the south west end of the harbor facing the course of the Woolpack, to whose outline the plan of the basin has been compared Further to the westward along the shore the Fort of the Cheura, at the head of a small bay, commanded the water supply which was brought by a canal to the city and protected the shore from hostile landing at the only available point: indeed it would appear that the Spaniards reckoned too confidently on the obstacles the rugged and apparently inaccessible cliffs which from the coast line would oppose to the landing of the invaders. and did not take those precautions expen enced and energetic soldiers would use to make the attempt impracticable. On the northern face along the channel leading to the harbor the defence consisted of three floating batteries, a square fort similar to but smaller than La Peinta, known as la Fuerza, and the vessels of the Spanish fleet which also covered the southern face of the town. This fleet consisted of 17 ships of the line mounting 850 guns, which were stationed in the harbor during the siege, shared the fortunes of the captured city and fortres and only added to the losses sustained by the Spanish monarchy, if they had been sacrificed in a sea fight the city would have been saved an action, would have hopolessly crippled the British fleet or if they had accepted the proffered c i of the French squadron lying securely at Port St. Francois hey would have been a match for the British fleet, which consisted of 23 sail of the line mounting 1500 guns. The French squadron consisted of eight ships of the line, and would have made the contending forces nearly equal, but the Spanish Governor of Havana positively refused to let the French enter the harbor for reasons doubtless best known to himself, as he stated that "be would as soon see an English squadm there."

The organisation and command of the ex pedition against this city in England was confided, as far as the land forces were con cerned, to the Earl of Albemarle, and the fleet to Sir George Pecocko. The former was to supersede General Monckeen in the West Indies and to take his army under his command, the latter to supersede Admiral It was intended to provide a total Rodney. force of 16,000 men, made up of the egi-ments then serving in North America and the West Indies with a proportion from England of about 4000 men, but when the forces were concentrated at Martinique it was found that after deducting the neces sary garrisons only about 11,000 men re-mained for the expedition. Measures however had been taken to reinforce this army with Provincial troops and a corps or two of negroes. As the fleet consisted of 203 ves sels of all classes it was necessary to use great caution in navigating it to the Havana, the best and safest course was to steer along the south shore of Cuba round the western most point of that island, and so fall into the track of the Galleons, but this was by far the longest and most tedious course and any delay might involve an advance into the he ricane season which in the then state of appliances for navigation was not desirable. Accordingly the Admiral determined to try the channel through the Bahama Straits, dangerous from its shoals and sand banks and the want of pilots acquainted with 118 intricacies, because it would be almost impossible to get the heavy laden transports to beat up successfully to windward of the western end of Cuba against currents and trade, winds, and having to run down the