

A NEW MAP OF EUROPE

Britannicus—"English Review."

Judged by whatever test one chooses to apply, whether of numbers, reserves of men and wealth, or capacity to sustain a drawn-out industrial and financial crisis, the enterprise on which Germany has embarked seems doomed to failure. None the less, it would be the very height of folly to imagine that anything less than the utmost strength of which all and each of the Allies are capable will suffice for her overthrow. They are not to realize that in this war all of the Kaiser's subjects are as united and as passionately convinced of the justice of their cause as we are ourselves, or who conceive that the hardy German spirit has lost anything of devotion and self-sacrifice, or who delude themselves with the idea that victory is essential to the maintenance of the enemy's fighting power. To all Germans this is a desperate struggle for national existence, and no hallucination could be more mischievous than to attempt to distinguish between Prussia and Bavaria, militarism and "culture," the war-party and the nation. Germany is one in a sense she never has been one in all her history; she can place in the field probably not less than 6,000,000 men; fighting on her own territory, behind defences that nature and the utmost military skill have rendered all but impregnable, and with her back to the wall, she will put up a resistance that will cease only with the last cartridge and the last shell. Moreover, the unpredictable chances that surround all warfare, and especially by sea, may, for all one can tell, favor her fortunes. A naval force, however preponderant, is not an absolute guarantee of security so long as the hostile fleet is still in being. There is need, therefore, for a much clearer appreciation of the nature and magnitude of the task ahead of us than one can profess to discover among our people as a whole; and need also for a far greater concentration of energy and foresight than has yet been effected. We have begun a prolonged and bitter struggle in which victory will be achieved only by the maximum of effort. Given that maximum, it is hardly open to question that ultimately victory will follow. But nothing less than the maximum will be enough.

This war will rank among the most momentous in history for this if for no other reason, that it can only end in a reshuffling on a scale never before attempted of the political boundaries and arrangements of Europe. Whichever side wins there will be a new dispensation. But with this difference. No German triumph would ever be accepted as final by Russia and no readjustment of the European map traced by the Kaiser's sword would have even the smallest guarantee of stability. On the other hand, there is a chance that a victory for the Allies

would lead to something like a permanent settlement, if only its main principles can be explored and agreed upon in advance. That is why it is not, even now, premature to discuss in a general way the sort of peace that the Allies should aim at, or the sort of peace Germany hopes to impose. Among the many aspects of the war not enough attention has been given to the consequences of a German victory or to their bearing on British interests. We know in these islands pretty well why we are at war and for what, but the popular mind still only partially understands the effects of a possible defeat. Everybody is aware we are fighting to safeguard the independence of Belgium, but comparatively few have realized what the independence of Belgium means to us, and why it is a matter of life and death for us to preserve it. Even the lesson of the fall of Antwerp has been only half learned and its aftermath only faintly guessed. People have discussed its connection with the military operations in France as though that were the sum of its significance. The truth, of course, is that it is absolutely vital to every British interest to see that Germany is turned out of Belgium bag and baggage. If Germany wins not only will Antwerp become an unassailable German base menacing our whole southeastern coast, not only will every shred of Belgian independence have vanished, but Holland will share the same fate. The fates of the two countries are inextricably intertwined. To suppose that a triumphant Germany would quietly allow the Dutch to remain as they are now, astride the Scheldt and the Rhine, with the key to Germany's front door in their pockets, and barring her out from the full freedom of the North Sea, is to suppose what is not merely incredible but fantastically so. The whole Belgian and Dutch littoral would fall immediately and inevitably into German hands, and a series of German Gibralters would spring up, the nearest of them only sixty miles from Dover, the furthest less than two hundred from Harwich or Sheerness.

A Germany permanently established on the Dutch and Belgian coasts and accumulating, behind their defences and within a few hours' steaming of our shores, the armed plant for an invasion of Great Britain, would mean that never again in this country should we have one moment's security. We should have to live year in and year out on a war footing, with naval estimates running into the hundred millions sterling. We simply could not stand the strain. Such a Power as Germany would then be would be irresistible. Our nerves, our money, would alike give out; our commerce would wither away. Whatever efforts we put forth Germany could surpass them. Secure in half a dozen unreachably strongholds from Antwerp and Flushing to the Kiel Canal, she would merely have to

wait and prepare. Our national existence would shrink into a shameful thing of ceaseless and subservient terrors. Our policies would be dictated from Berlin. A wave of Germany's hand, and we should be obliged to dismiss any Minister to whom she objected, just as France a few years ago under the proddings of the German ramrod had to dismiss M. Delcasse. And one day the blow would fall, and Napoleon ever had it in his power to deal. It would not be a raid; it would be an invasion. We might be able to repel it once, twice, three times. But it would be incessantly renewed. Our Fleet, whatever happened elsewhere and however great the need of it in other parts of the Empire, could never for a moment leave the North Sea. It would be tied down to the supreme necessity of guarding against Germany. Sooner or later, by the mere law of averages, Germany would break through. Great Britain would be invaded as Belgium and France have been invaded, but with a far greater passion of hatred, and these famous islands might sink, in the grim phrase of Sir Edward Grey, to be "the conscript appendage" of their German rulers. And these are not hypothetical possibilities, not things that may happen, but that must happen, if Germany wins and Belgium and Holland become parts of the German Empire. But a German triumph carries with it greater consequences than that. It implies the subjugation and dismemberment of France. It means that there would be nothing to prevent Germany's demanding the surrender of the whole French Colonial Empire and of whatever ports or naval bases on the northern coast of France she might care to choose. Such a victory as Prussia gained in the war of 1870 might, if it were to be repeated to-day, lead to Germany's being planted not only as our restless and hostile neighbor in Africa and Asia, but as our implacable enemy in Calais, Havre, or Boulogne, and disputing with us the very freedom of the English Channel.

Thus even if Germany avoids, as she can indefinitely, a decisive naval action, and if both the British and German fleets thereby come out of the war practically intact, a German victory on land would entail consequences utterly subversive of British security. What else it would entail in the pillaging of French wealth and territory and in the condemnation of the Balkans to an inferno of endless strife between Slav and Teuton, one need not stay to inquire. For it is evident that no such conditions of peace dictated by Germany, however lenient towards Russia, could ever be accepted by the Tsardom as more than a temporary armistice. If there is one thing that Europe should have learned by now it is that to multiply Alsace-Lorraine is to multiply wars, armaments and a chronic unrest. But if Germany were to reduce Russia and France to the point where they would feel obliged to sue for peace we should have merely a

starting-point for new wars, a war for the conquest of Holland, another for the expansion of German influence and power in the Balkans and along the Adriatic, and a third for the humiliation of Italy. And this would be so even if the Wilhelmstrasse asked little or nothing from Russia and contented itself with stripping France of her Colonies. Even, therefore, if Germany succeeded—it is an all but unthinkable contingency—in driving a wedge between the Allies and inducing or coercing some of them to make peace separately, it is clear that on the basis of German ascendancy there can be no durable tranquility in Europe. A victory for the Allies on the other hand, if properly utilized, ought to mean not only a very different Europe from any this generation has known, but one redrawn along the lasting lines of justice and nationality. There are those, I know, who look forward to something much more than this, who hope that as the result of this struggle the peoples of Europe will be equipped with a new set of dominant ideas such as will make war impossible, who anticipate the beginnings of universal disarmament, and who seem to take it for granted that kingship and its baneful concomitant of dynastic interests will disappear. That something really effective will be done to chain down militarism is very probable. It certainly will be done if the democracies are able to make themselves felt. It almost as certainly will not be done if the professional diplomatists take charge of the settlement. Nor is it likely that the prodigious task of remaking Europe along big lines of sanity and contentment will be adequately discharged unless popular opinion in the countries that will draft the final terms of peace is informed, vigilant and operative. We have had in the past diplomatic rearrangements without number. The Berlin Congress, the European Concert, such profound facilities as the diplomatic "settlement" of the Cretan and Albanian questions—it is vital to get clear of that whole atmosphere of fencing, timidity and make-believe. There must be clean sweeps, a bold use of the knife, and a firm subordination of monarchial and strategic fancies to the fulfilment of national desires.

Whatever the part taken by Great Britain in prosecuting this war to a victorious finish, her power and influence ought to be second to none in determining the subsequent reconstruction of Europe. We shall stand in a position of immense and beneficent possibilities, and it will be altogether our own fault if we fail to turn them to account. It was primarily to protect the independence of the small nations that we entered the war, and their future and security must be our first consideration. The union of severed peoples, the restoration of disrupted States, the simplification of European and especially south-eastern politics by satisfying the claims of blood and speech, the abolition of whatever prevents a distinctive and homogeneous group or race or nationality from deciding its own destiny and expanding to the full limits of its individual power and consciousness—it is to principles such as these that we must nail our colors. The end to be kept in view, said Mr. Asquith, at Dublin, is "the idea of public right." "What does it mean," he said, "when translated into concrete terms? It means first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the relations of States and of the future moulding of the European world. It means next that room must be found and kept for the independent existence and the free development of the smaller nationalities, each with a corporate consciousness of its own. Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and the Balkan States—they must be recognized as having exactly as good a title as their powerful neighbors, more powerful in strength and in wealth, to a place in the sun. And it means, finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambition, for groupings and alliances, and a precarious equipoise, of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal rights, and established and enforced by a common will. A year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. It is probably one that may not, or will not, be realized either to-day or to-morrow. But when this war is decided in favor of the Allies it will at once come within the range, and before long within the grasp, of European statesmanship." In much

the same sense Mr. Winston Churchill has outlined his idea of the new Europe. "Let us be careful," he said, "not to make the same mistake, or the same sort of mistake, as Germany made when she had France prostrate at her feet in 1870. Let us, whatever we do, fight for and work towards great and sound principles for the European system. The first of those principles which we should keep before us is the principle of nationality, that is to say, not the conquest or subjugation of any great community, or of any strong race of men, but the setting free of those races which have been subjugated and conquered. And if doubt arises about disputed areas of country, we should try to settle their ultimate destination in the reconstruction of Europe which must follow from this war with a fair regard to the wishes and feelings of the people who live in them."

The principle of nationality, modified in particular instances by a sort of local option—this is to be our guiding star. Let us see whether it will lead us. What sort of a Europe would emerge from the application of this convulsive principle to the existing system? Obviously whatever else would emerge, Austria-Hungary would not. That polyglot and inverted chaos, held together for so long by fears that have now ceased to terrify, a mosaic of racial antipathies, destitute of anything resembling a sense of common patriotism, is the very negation of all that is understood by the principle of nationality. I have never been among those who believed that Austria-Hungary would one day break up through the violence of its internal antagonisms. Is there, indeed, a single instance in modern history of a State, not shattered to pieces by a foreign foe, but shattering itself to pieces by the force of centrifugal reaction? Apart from the monarchy, the dynasty, the Army, and what Palacky called the "international necessity" of Austria-Hungary, I have never felt it paradoxical to maintain that the defiant strength of the Dual Monarchy has been largely due to its very complexity; that the diversity of the enmities it contains has really made for equilibrium; and that there has been, in fact, a static quality in its cross-currents and cross-purposes, and in the intermingling of its multifarious opposites. But the war has necessarily shifted the whole angle from which the problem of the Dual Monarchy must be approached. If one can believe even half of the confident announcements of the General Staff in Petrograd, the spectacle presented by Austria-Hungary to-day is that of an Empire in process not merely of dissolution, but of annihilation. As a military power it has apparently already been broken. As a State it seems equally destined to perish in unlamented violence; and such has been its diplomacy, such its governing incapacity, that three-fourths at least of its peoples hail its humiliating disasters and look forward to its ultimate disruption as the stepping-stones to a brighter future.

The vivisection of this "ramshackle Empire" in accordance with the claims of racial affinity has long been the speculative amusement of publicists. There is now a prospect of its being carried out in the concrete. The promise made in the name of the Tsar of the restoration of ancient Poland disposes of Galicia; Roumania will undoubtedly demand

Transylvania and union with her kinsmen; Serbia and Montenegro have established by war their right to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slavonia; the Magyars presumably would form an autonomous State of their own; Italy will certainly absorb the Trentino and Trieste, and possibly Pola and Fiume; and from the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia there may be formed another self-governing State under the suzerainty of the Tsar. But if the principle of nationality is rigidly adhered to, the 10,000,000 German speaking Austrians and the districts they inhabit will necessarily be added to the German Empire, which would then become in very truth the Empire of the Germans. With what degree of enthusiasm the Prussians would welcome the incorporation of so many millions of Catholics, or the soft and easy-going Viennese would rejoice over the change from the Hapsburgs to the Hohenzollerns, I will not attempt to determine. But it seems clear that if Mr. Churchill's warning against subjugating any strong race of men and against setting up another Alsace-Lorraine meant anything, it meant that Germany is to be compensated for territorial losses in some directions by accessions in others. A victory for the Allies necessarily carries with it the surrender to France of Alsace and Lorraine, some readjustment of the Belgian frontier, probably by the annexation of Luxembourg, and perhaps, too, the restoration of Schleswig-Holstein to the Danes. At the same time the province of Posen is earmarked for the rounding off of the autonomous Poland. The calculation, therefore, appears to be that if these losses are offset by the magnificent acquisition of German-speaking Austria, Germany will have little or nothing to complain of, will harbor no resentment, will emerge a greater and a more homogeneous Power than she is to-day, and will be deprived of any excuse for mediating a new *revanche*.

There are many other questions like the future of Heligoland and the Kiel Canal and the means to be taken for rendering Prussian militarism impotent for further mischief, and the indemnity problem that lie rather outside the purpose of this article. On the other hand, the Balkans, as the classic home of racial convulsions, come well within its scope, and offer for all political cartographers a peculiarly tempting field. Speculation is narrowed down to the possibilities of recapturing the frame of mind that made the Balkan League the happiest, if all time he never saw a flag or heard a gleam of sunshine that has yet fallen across South-eastern Europe. It would be a fruitful day for Great Britain if, through the confidence of the smaller nationalities in our statesmanship, an accommodation could be effected that would take off the edge of Bulgarian resentment against her former Allies. With the malign influence of Austria-Hungary finally shaken off, the Macedonian question under British auspices might easily lend itself to a give-and-take settlement that Serbia could afford to offer and Bulgaria could afford to accept. There would then be left over little more than the question of Albania as a clear case for "local option." A Europe thus transformed in consonance with a central idea would assuredly be a more peaceful Europe than any that is likely to be the offspring of a Teutonic victory. An era of real contentment

and of expanding democracy may, if the peoples of the Allied Powers have the vision and the strength to will it, be the fruit of Germany's defeat. But Germany must be defeated first.

International Feeling Make War Impossible

Miss Jane Addams, who was the chief speaker yesterday afternoon at a meeting held under the auspices of the Collegiate Common Sense League for International Law and Order, told a large audience in St. Paul's Chapel at Columbia University, that there was already so strong an international feeling against war that it had become almost impossible. To show how strong this sentiment was, Miss Addams, who was introduced by Professor Franklin H. Giddings, cited a case related to her by an officer of the International Seamen's Union.

"After the war started, about half of the members of the union entered the navy," she said, "and an English boat manned by members of the union captured a German boat, on which were also union men. When the Englishmen brought in their captives they asked the Government to put the captives in charge. If the Government took them they would be treated as enemies, and as members of the union the Englishmen felt that the Germans were their friends. So they bought land outside London, put up some shacks on it, and there the German seamen were cared for by the English sailors out of the messenger funds of the union."

She then told of an eminent philologist who, when he learned that many of his associates, also men of distinction, had perished in the trenches, had said that he could not reconcile himself to the loss of these men whether they were his countrymen or in the ranks of the enemy. "This feeling of men as scientists must assert itself over the national feeling," said Miss Addams. "Already the larger life is there and must prevail over the other, which is more or less ephemeral. This war spirit cannot last in spite of the splendid patriotism upholding it. It is archaic."


"There was one man, a Polish Jew," the speaker continued, "who was sparing another man with a bayonet, think of that in these days! And as the other man succumbed he threw up his arms and repeated the prayer for the dying in Hebrew. It was too much for the man who attacked him. His reason gave way. There are closed fields which take men back from the field. In spite of their patriotism, they will, and their splendid courage, they lose their minds."

"A reporter who was four months at the front told me that in all that time he never saw a flag or heard a drum. He said the men looked like sewer diggers. He said that with one battery in action the Captain was lying in a pool of water with his ear at a telephone. Every once in a while he would give an order and wearily the men would get up and fire and go down again. That was what they had been doing for days, and in the meantime their number had been reduced from eighty to twenty-six."

"It seems to me that the militarists should apologize to the world. The passivists can say at least that they are fighting to save human life." Pledges were distributed among those at the meeting, and the signers promised to oppose militarism and the militaristic spirit, and to endeavor to promote international law and order. Miss Addams also spoke at a noon meeting at the College of the City of New York, to inaugurate a series of meetings against war. New York Times, March 12th.

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