

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Note de la Direction du désarmement
Memorandum by Disarmament Division*

CONFIDENTIAL

SUGGESTED BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DISCONTINUANCE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS

1. The nuclear powers would agree to discontinue all nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.

2. In addition, while negotiations were undertaken with the aim of developing a mutually acceptable system for verifying compliance with an international treaty which would include the prohibition of underground nuclear weapons tests, the nuclear powers would agree to an interim arrangement with respect to underground nuclear tests. The duration of the interim arrangement would be, initially, six months, to be extended by further periods of three months by agreement among the nuclear powers. The terms of the interim arrangement would be as set forth in paragraph 3 below.

(*Note:* Paragraphs 1 and 2 follow from paragraph 6 of General Assembly Resolution 1762 (XVI[I]), Part A. They may, however, be unacceptable to the Soviet Union which might contend that they provided in effect for a permanent ban on nuclear tests in the three environments but only for a temporary suspension of underground tests which could lapse and thereby leave the USSR at a disadvantage. As a result, it may be necessary, as a fall-back position, to allow for the possibility that the interim arrangement would be applied both to tests in the three environments and to underground tests.)

3. The nuclear powers would agree to suspend underground nuclear weapons tests with the following arrangements for verification of compliance with this measure:

(i) An Interim International Scientific Commission would be established, to be composed of qualified experts from each of the members of the Eighteen Nation Committee on disarmament;

(*Note:* This composition would be desirable in that it makes use of a body which is already functioning and that it would probably make it easier to establish the Commission without delay. It would also have the advantage of ensuring that the nuclear powers would have a say in matters affecting their security.)

On the other hand, the neutral memorandum of April 16, 1962 suggests that the members of the Scientific Commission should compromise a "limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from the non-aligned countries." They might argue that the Interim Commission should also be so composed rather than involving the nuclear powers and their allies as well. There are additional difficulties if the nuclear powers and their allies are included: first, it might be thought that the scientific representatives of the nuclear powers would not be objective but would be obliged to bring in findings consistent with the policy of their governments; second, the Commission might be thought, in general terms, to be more "political" than scientific if the nuclear powers and their allies were included; third, it might look as if the Eighteen Nation Committee were trying to usurp the rights of other states if it decided that its own membership should form the Interim Commission. If it is considered necessary to alter the composition of the Interim Commission to meet these objections, the following slate of neutrals (listing them in order of their technical competence in this field, as suggested by our own experts) might be put forward: Japan, Sweden, India, Chile, Mexico, Switzerland, UAR, Indonesia, Austria and Nigeria.)