

te objects are  
t grants that  
passively into  
ception, as he  
knowledge to  
. In reality,  
f combination,  
dual concretes  
her unity, but  
which at first  
the categories  
or rather, as  
possible; and  
ty of concrete  
s.  
ere fictions of  
o an imperfec-  
categories them-  
rm of thought,  
e manifold of  
ant, virtually a  
as of the mind  
e manifold, the  
stitution of the  
re supplied to  
ngly, as before  
ong only to us  
re regarded as  
e limits of ex-  
s might apply  
y given to us;  
nowledge beyond  
han a sensuous

I shall not here repeat what has been said above in regard to the absurdity of supposing the particular element to be given in any other sense than that in which we may say, with equal propriety, that the universal element or category is given; it will be enough to point out that, when we have got rid of this contrast of activity and receptivity, the abstract isolation of the categories from the other elements of knowledge is completely done away with. The category in itself is spoken of by Kant as if it had a sort of independent existence of its own. It is a potential form of thought belonging to the framework of the mind, and capable of coming into actual use only in relation to the manifold of sense as determined in time by the pure imagination. But, just as the manifold of sense is simply the particular element in every real act or product of knowledge, taken in abstraction from its relation to the universal element, and as the schema is simply the abstraction of the relation of those elements to each other, so the category is but the universal element, with its relation to the particular eliminated. In other words, the apparent independence of the category is due entirely to the reflection of the individual thinker. We *distinguish* the universal from the particular, but every real act of knowledge is the mutual reflection of the one on the other. There is therefore no propriety in saying that the categories *might* be extended beyond experience, provided that a manifold different from that given to us were supplied to them. One element of knowledge can by no possibility exist except in its relation to the other; if the particular is nothing apart from the universal, neither is the universal anything apart from the particular. Kant virtually admits that his distinction of the categories from the schemata is