rather weak, because they are not taken from under any federal constitution, but from under colonial Acts, which are of course guided by the principles obtaining in England. In my humble opinion he seems to attach too much importance to the practice which has obtained in the past. He seems to have come to the conclusion that, because for thirty, forty, or fifty years this House had not amended a supply Bill, it has therefore agreed to forego the power to do so. We are governed by a written constitution and that constitution cannot be amended by practice. We have no power to amend that constitution by practice or otherwise. It can be amended only by the Imperial Parliament; and so long as it has not been amended it will be the duty of this branch of Parliament to exercise its powers as they are to be found in that constitution.

The honourable gentleman from Middleton very properly drew attention to the difference between the Canadian constitution and that of England. The British constitution, being unitary and designed to carry out the will of the majority of the nation, the King and Lords and Commons have a jurisdiction one and undivided; whereas the Canadian constitution, being that of a federation, involves the protection of provincial interests. This protection of provincial interests, which is one of the main functions of the Canadian Senate, is what differentiates it from the House of Lords as regards their respective relations with the Commons.

There is no doubt that originally the House of Lords in England had coordinate powers with the House of Commons in money Bills as in all other Bills. May's Privileges of Parliament, third edition, page 22, says that the three estates of the realm originally sat together in one chamber.

James Stephen, in his commentaries on the Laws of England, volume 2, 7th edition, page 321, says:

> It is generally agreed that, in the main, the constitution of parliament, as it now stands, was marked out so long ago as the 17th year of King John, A.D. 1215, in the great charter granted by that prince, wherein he promises to summon all archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls and greater barons, personally; and all other tenants in chief under the Crown, by the sheriff and bailiffs, to meet at a certain place, within forty days' notice, to assess aids and scutages when necessary. And this constitution has subsisted in fact at least from the year 1264, 49 Henry III, there being still extant writs of that date to summon Knights, citizens and burgesses to Parliament.

On page 327, speaking of the distribution of the legislative and executive power between the King, the Lords, and the Commons, he adds:

> The Crown cannot begin of itself any alterations in the present established law; but it may approve or disapprove of the alterations suggested and consented to by the two Houses. The legislative therefore cannot abridge the executive power of any rights which it now has by law, without its own consent, since the law must perpetually stand as it now does unless all the powers will agree to alter it; and herein indeed consists the true excellence of the English government, that all the parts of it form a mutual check upon each other. In the legislature the people are a check upon the nobility, and the nobility a check upon the people, by the mutual privilege of rejecting what the other has resolved; while the Sovereign is a check upon both, which preserves the executive power from encroachments.

Occasion may arise when it may be the duty of this honourable House to act as a check on the House of Commons in the protection of the rights of the provinces. He goes on to say:

> And this very executive power is again checked and kept within due bounds by the two Houses, through the privilege they have of inquiring into, impeaching and punishing the conduct (not indeed of the Sovereign, which would destroy his constitutional independence, but which is more beneficial to the public) of his evil and pernicious councillors. Thus, every branch of our civil policy supports and is supported, regulates and is regulated by the rest; for the two Houses naturally drawing in two directions of opposite interest, and the prerogative in another still different from them both, they mutually keep each other from exceeding their proper limits, while the whole is prevented from separation and artificially connected together by the mixed nature of the Crown, which is a part of the legislature, and the sole executive magistrate. Like three distinct powers in mechanics, they jointly impel the machine of government in a direction different from what either acting by itself would have done, but at the same time in a direction partaking of each, and formed out of all; a direction which constitutes the true line of the liberty and happiness of the community.

The quotation may be considered too long, but the words used are so appropriate in their bearing on such an important subject that they cannot be too often repeated.

Of late years the British Parliament has been called upon to grant constitutions. On the occasion of the granting of a constitution to the Commonwealth of Australia the Imperial Parliament deemed it advisable to better define the powers of the House of Commons and of the Senate or Upper House. Section 53 of that constitution provides:

> Proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys, or imposing taxation, shall not originate