

Reform Bill in England the supreme power has been vested practically in the House of Commons, and in the Cabinet, which is now the executive in England. The monarch is not the executive any longer. The members of the upper House so far as new members are constituted, are appointed by the executive and the executive there represents the popular majority in the House of Commons; and practically at the present day—indirectly, of course, but still practically—the House of Lords are kept in touch with the people by the fact that they are appointed by the executive which represents the popular will at the time. We are not directly in touch with the people here, but the members of this House are appointed in the same way as the members of the House of Lords are to-day. We are not appointed by the Queen. The Queen knows nothing about us. We are not really appointed by the Governor General though nominally we are. Practically, the Governor General has nothing to do with our appointment. The members of this House are appointed by the executive of the day, and that executive represents the majority of the House of Commons.

It being six o'clock, the Speaker left the chair.

### After Recess.

HON. MR. POWER resumed his speech. He said: While I thought that the House was under an obligation to the hon. gentleman who brought this matter before us, and while he showed industry and judgment in the information that he selected and the illustrations that he gave us, I think, if I might say so, that he omitted what was a most essential thing, and that was to give us his idea as to the qualities which the second Chamber should have; and then the hon. gentleman might have proceeded to show that those qualities would be most likely to be found in a Chamber elected as he proposes that this House should be elected. The hon. gentleman seemed to think that a Senate elected as is the Senate of the United States would be the best upper House for Canada. Now I think that he overlooked, when he took that ground, the difference between the system of Government under which we live and that which prevails in the United States. We live, as most British colonies live,

under a system which is substantially identical with the system of the Mother Country, and that is totally different from the American system. In all countries governed according to the British system, the supreme power resides ultimately in the majority of the House of Commons and is wielded directly by an executive which is bound to have the confidence of a majority of the popular branch of Parliament. Now, that is not the American system at all. The American system of government is an elaborate system of checks, and it would be difficult to say where the principal power resides, or what is the ultimate seat of power in the American form of Government. But under the British system power ultimately resides in the representatives of the people; and Governments constructed according to the British form have executives that are more directly responsible to the electors than are the executive under the American system. Now the second Chamber in a system such as ours and that of the British Parliament should not be equal in power to the lower House. That is not what we want. We do not want a second House of Commons: we do not want a body that is capable, as is the United States Senate, of dealing with every kind of subject. We must recognize the fact that the ultimate seat of power is in the House of Commons; and we want a second Chamber which will supplement that House and make up for its defects. Now, having laid down that proposition, I think rather an elementary proposition, I shall venture to say what I think an ideal Senate should be. It should be a body governed by a calm and judicial spirit. It should be a body made up as far as possible of upright and independent men; and it should be a patient body—a body that will take time to deal with the legislative and other business that comes before it; and of course it should be an intelligent body. Further, it should be—and that is implied in saying that it should be a calm and judicial body—a body that would not be much influenced by the passions of the hour. These passions arise in every country, and sweep over the face of the land, and are very intense as a rule for a short time; and their length of life is generally short in proportion as they are intense. The upper House should not be a body that would be liable to be influenced