

machinery. It may also imply help in organizing locally, so that farm machinery sent over from this continent may be used collectively on many farms.

Again, millions of people have been taken from one part of Europe and carted away to other parts, hundreds of miles away from home, to work in German munition factories. These people want to be sent home as soon as possible. A big organization will be needed, in which UNRRA will cooperate with local authorities in sorting them out. But they cannot be sent home until transportation facilities are available, and the enemy will have pulled up the railways, destroyed the rolling stock or stolen it. The military authorities will repair enough to make the railways usable for military purposes. UNRRA will help the local civilian authorities in completing the repair job, so that people may be transported back to their homes, when and if it becomes geographically possible. To that end we shall have to provide them with rails, locomotives and rolling stock to begin with, and later machine tools with which to make more locomotives and rolling stock for themselves. If this sort of thing is not done on a systematic basis, with proper organization carefully worked out in advance, it has to be done anyhow, sooner or later, by someone, and will cost the whole world, Canada included, a hundred times more when done later and by hazard.

A practical example of how the presence of a well prepared organization can work wonders by prompt intervention is found in the case of the Tunisian olive crop, which was saved, soon after the allied troops entered that country, by the intervention of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, a United States agency which preceded UNRRA. The crop was on the verge of being lost because the olive farmers had no cloths to spread on the ground, to catch the olives as they were shaken from the trees. The American agency had big stocks of cloth in North Africa accumulated for supplying clothing and the like in relief operations. They brought this cloth out and put it at the disposal of the olive farmers, and the crop was harvested. That saved, for the markets of the world, an enormous supply of olive oil—not a small matter in view of the shortage of vegetable oils these days. From the pressing of the olives there remained a residue of fat which was available for the making of soap. In North Africa the local soap industry depends on the olive industry for its fats. Skin diseases are very prevalent in North Africa, and one of the most urgently needed supplies to combat them is plenty of soap. So that if the olive crop had not been saved, many cargo

ships would have had to be diverted from the transport of war supplies to cart soap and disinfectant supplies to North Africa; the shortage of vegetable fats in North America would have been still more acute than it is, and a large part of the agricultural population of North Africa would have been in the depths of despair from the failure of its crops. That is only a very small example of the things that UNRRA will have to do when the enemy troops begin rolling back in Europe and Asia and conquered populations become free again.

Now, the natural question that arises in everyone's mind, I suppose, is "What is it going to cost us?" Since in the opinion of the highest authorities in forty-four fighting nations it is a question of whether democratic civilization survives or not, some people might be inclined to say that the cost does not matter. We have to pay or go under. Or they might look at it like the women in a recent cartoon, "Quit looking at those income tax papers. We can't afford it anyhow." But the most intriguing feature of that, to my humble mind, is that we can easily afford it; in fact, it is a mere bagatelle. I have seen official figures to the effect that the united nations will subscribe together about two and a half billion dollars to carry out this work of providing the victim nations with their immediate needs, and helping them get on their feet and become able to take care of their own needs. That figure is based on the decision taken at the Atlantic City meeting, that participating nations should tax themselves one per cent of their national revenue for the year ending June 30, 1943. I understand Canada's contribution is to be between \$70,000,000 and \$90,000,000.

After all, I recall that Canada has on two occasions contributed a billion dollars to the cause of the united nations. And I have yet to meet a Canadian citizen who is one cent worse off for it. I have yet to find a Canadian who was better off in the years when Canada did not give anything to that cause than he is now, unless misfortune has hit him from some other source entirely unconnected with war finance. The dominion government is having as hard a time preventing people from spending their money foolishly and unpatriotically to-day as it ever had before the billion dollar annual contributions were inaugurated. There seems to be a general feeling that if the Dominion of Canada had kept two billions of dollars in its own coffers, the people would not have had any more money to spend, Canada would not have been any richer; nobody would have been any richer, and nobody would have been any better off. How that works out, not being a trained economist, an international banker or a chartered account-