

— Third, if we are to reach that level of maturity, we shall have to grapple with difficult problems of misperception on both sides — blind spots and distortions, subjective errors of analysis or of judgment.

Few of my interlocutors, for example, seemed genuinely able to perceive, let alone concede, the gravity of the threat posed to Western countries by the deployment of Soviet SS-20s. And for our part, I wondered whether we in the West had not significantly underestimated the full impact on the East of the combination of INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] deployment with the harsh rhetoric of recent years.

It will be uphill work to gain a more accurate perception of each other, and to gauge more accurately the consequences of our various words and deeds. From a confrontational deadlock where INF deployment must continue, and negotiations must be restored, only the "third rail" of political confidence and communication can ensure an early and constructive outcome.

In reflecting on these conclusions, and on the substance of my talks in eastern and western capitals alike, it is clear to me that areas of common interest are beginning to emerge. Let me suggest ten principles of a common bond between East and West:

- (1) Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- (2) Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- (3) Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
- (4) Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- (5) Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- (6) Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- (7) Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- (8) Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries — so-called horizontal proliferation.
- (9) Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- (10) Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

As decalogues go, this may seem modest. But I wonder, in this period when there are positive signs of emergence from a time of crisis, whether there is not sound purpose in going back to basics; beginning