

countries work together to our own mutual advantage, the easier it will be for us to bear in mind our responsibilities to the world system at large and to the developing world in particular.

The facts of interdependence, in any case, are rapidly catching up with us. Regardless of how we manage our economies, we cannot, any of us, escape the implications of the energy crisis; or of the depletion of other natural resources that we have used improvidently; or of the pressure that the rising expectations of our peoples put on the finite capacities of our economies; or of the unrealized demand that is represented by the millions of disenfranchised consumers in the countries of the Third World. This is not a matter of convergence of our systems; but it is a matter of convergence of interests and concerns that we share. We should be ill-advised to disavow that convergence. We shall be much less able to deal with these problems in doctrinal isolation. But we shall not be able to work together at all unless we deal with each other in the spirit of mutual confidence that the Final Act was intended to impart to our economic relations, as to our relations over a wider spectrum.

In the end, however, it is the weight we are prepared to give to the human dimension of the Final Act that will determine the climate of confidence between us. That such a proposition should itself cause concern is a measure of the distance that still separates us from the objectives we set ourselves at Helsinki.

It is sometimes argued that to place human rights and humanitarian co-operation so high in the scale of priorities is to distort the balance of the Final Act and to distort the balance of the benefits we expect from it. We in Canada cannot subscribe to that argument. The great barrier our efforts are intended to breach is, in the first instance, a barrier between people. We cannot expect to build a structure of co-operation that will prove solid unless it involves our people and unless they identify their interests with it. We cannot proceed on the assumption that relations between states can remain unaffected where respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is seen to be deficient. On the contrary, the link is explicitly drawn in the Final Act and we should do well to keep it in mind as our deliberations go forward.

We acknowledge that many of the principles and provisions of the Final Act are in the form of unilateral undertakings by participating states. We believe, nevertheless, that all these undertakings are a legitimate subject for discussion at our meeting here in Belgrade. This applies to human rights and human contacts, as it does to the other subjects that come within the ambit of our review. We cannot agree that such a discussion constitutes an intervention in the internal affairs of participating states. We are here to measure progress and the only measure we can apply is the degree to which undertakings freely assumed by governments are being carried out.

The point is sometimes made that the problem with human rights is that they are subject to very different interpretations. It is true that different societies attach different weights to particular human rights. It is also true that some societies claim precedence for the rights of the collectivity over those of the individual. We are not here to arbitrate those differences. But we do not believe that matters of definition should stand

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