

In Northeastern and Southern Thailand, there are the beginnings of the same kind of terror which marked the first phase of insurgency in South Vietnam. As in the case of South Vietnam, this is being aided and abetted from outside but with this difference, that the Thai Patriotic Front, as it is called, is still operating from Peking. It has within the past several weeks been joined by a new clandestine organization, the National Liberation League and Army of Malaysia, which is dedicated to the overthrow by revolutionary means of the Government of Malaysia.

Are we, then, seriously to assume that all these movements are coming into being because the legitimate channels of local dissent in these countries have been closed? Or is this part of the pattern of permanent revolution which is being propagated in some quarters? I suggest to the House, on my responsibility as Secretary of State for External Affairs, that these are questions which we must seriously ponder before we condemn United States policy in Vietnam ....

That is our assessment of the forces that are at work in the present conflict. There are those who would have us alter that assessment for the mere sake of giving the appearance of Canadian independence as though independence consisted only in taking positions which are necessarily against those of one's friends. Our policy in this situation represents our own honest assessment of the position and is not a reflection in any way of pressure imposed on us by the United States or by any other country. In this matter we are as independent as in Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. I say to the House that, after more than 11 years of active involvement in the situation in Vietnam, we are perfectly capable of arriving at an independent assessment of that situation without having recourse to false credentials. The question we must surely ask ourselves is this: Can we ignore the challenge of the aggression by these Communist liberation fronts in Asia?

Were we able to ignore the situation in Europe 20 years ago? I am not saying that the situation in Europe now is comparable with that existing at present in Asia. Undoubtedly there is a détente in effect between the West and the Soviet Union in Europe. I am talking about the situation in Asia, where a different state of affairs prevails but where there are some comparisons to the history of the immediate post-war period in Europe. No one will deny that mistakes have been made in Asia and I think some have been made by the United States. But there is, it seems to me, a parallel between the situation in Asia and that in Europe following the end of the war.

We must ask ourselves what the failure of United States efforts in Asia would mean to us as well as to that country. We must ask ourselves what it would mean to India, to Thailand, to the island countries, the Philippines, New Zealand and Australia. We must ask ourselves what it would mean to many countries in Asia and Africa which, although critical of the United States, would be deeply concerned over a Communist victory in Vietnam. I ask what would be the concern of the Soviet Union in these circumstances. I must ask the House whether Canada's real interests would be promoted by a United States defeat. I must ask the House what such a defeat would mean by way of encouragement to an aggressive brand of political action. It is