

financial necessity - to organize itself in a way which would make it more difficult for us to trade with it, and especially with the United Kingdom.

The whole problem is an immensely complicated one, and we should not approach it either complacently or impatiently, nor can it be solved by Europe acting alone or North America acting alone. Even regional isolation will be no good here. But we can be reasonably optimistic about the outcome. The way in which the United States and Canada have accepted their international economic responsibilities in recent years is, I think, an earnest of our goodwill and determination to accept those that lie ahead. Canada's post-war loans, credits and gifts to European recovery and reconstruction is proof of our desire to help. The United States Marshall Aid Plan, that great act of imaginative statesmanship, but which is soon coming to an end, would alone exonerate our neighbour from any charge of selfish nationalism. No matter what the ledgers may show when the final accounting of the European Recovery Programme is made, we shall never be able adequately to estimate the value of its contribution to the salvation of the whole Western world from the forces of Russian communist imperialism. We have only to consider the political programme of the Cominform and the tight and tyrannical treaties which the Soviet Union has concluded with her Eastern European neighbours to appreciate the quality and magnanimity of the Marshall Plan and its ability to produce the results which are essential if the dark rush of Soviet communism is to be checked.

But much remains to be done. The Point IV programme of technical assistance under the United Nations to underdeveloped countries is one important development. The burden of sterling debts which so greatly hampers British full recovery must be considered as more than a British problem and something done about it. The move to a wider European unity - financial and economic - must be pressed further, but not in such a way as to divide Europe from North America. Investors on this side must be prepared to send their money abroad, but they are entitled, on their part, to reasonable profit and security if they do; or at least the assurance that insecurity will not arise through arbitrary action which is political in origin.

All these issues, all these problems, all these possibilities can be examined, not merely bilaterally, but through the collective machinery of our North Atlantic system, which will, I hope carry on when the arrangements set up under the Marshall Plan disappear, as they are expected to do in 1952. We don't need to expect miracles, but we have every right to expect a serious effort by the Atlantic alliance to begin now to plan for the days ahead and to meet the challenge of the international economic as well as the international political problems of this tense and difficult time. This effort may necessitate financial, economic and even psychological adjustments by the North Atlantic states. These are never easy to make within the framework of national sovereignty. If, however, we insist on defining the problem in terms of broad regional rather than national interest, and if we keep our eyes fixed upon the ultimate objective of a world in which the economic causes of war, and the social and political conditions which breed war, will be reduced to the very lowest possible level, we can succeed in this great task.

Canada must continue to play the good part in these international economic questions that she has played in the past. No country has done more to implement the ideas I have outlined than ours. That, I think, was intelligent self-interest on our part and we should follow along that road as far as we can. How far we