

some extent the basic ideological and other differences with which we are all too familiar in the United Nations, would always prevent such agreement. No proposed solution for the Congo, no faction in its internal political conflict, can win an absolute majority of support here.

What is perhaps worse is that the divisions here to a considerable extent inhibit the reaching of a solution there. It must already have been remarked in the Congo that, although we insist here that the Congolese should settle their own political differences, there is no corresponding enthusiasm - there may, indeed, be outright condemnation - when some of the political leaders in the Congo get together and do in fact attempt to settle some of their political differences.

This is a deplorable situation, and it prompts me to ask very seriously indeed: Is the United Nations incapable of assisting the Republic of the Congo to find a solution to its political problems? Must we perpetuate, in that unhappy country, the differences which plague us here?

This need not be so, I believe - but on one condition. This condition is that we admit the truth of what I have just been saying: that none of us can hope to win majority support here for the particular type of solution he favours for the Congo, or majority acceptance of the particular Congolese leader or faction he endorses. Once this is admitted, I believe that the United Nations can in fact leave the Congolese people to settle their own political problems - can even give them impartial and constructive assistance to that end.

It is clear that the United Nations cannot, and should not, remain indefinitely in the Congo. Perhaps it is not too early, therefore, to ask ourselves what minimum conditions of order, stability and security should be met before the task of the United Nations forces there can be completed. Looking forward to that day, we should be prepared to admit that the situation which