

point or another are capable of sapping the credibility and sense of worth of those who are operationally responsible for the enterprise many years down the road. It is a paradox that we are talking here about new civil dangers to which disposition itself gives rise in reducing old military threats over what promises to be an unusually long period of time.

Beyond all this there is the potential for a failure of disposition in Russia to deal a blow to nuclear disarmament as such. The two principals currently hold very large amounts of WGPu, some 100 tonnes in the United States and, depending on whose numbers one uses, up to twice that amount in the Russian Federation. For each to disposition 34 tonnes is surely good, but not good enough. The costs, risks, and generally the time and trouble entailed in dispositioning 34 tonnes each would not be worth it if that's all they were to do. But 34 tonnes could be the limit for Russia if things went badly for an international programme in support of disposition there. There is no substitute for doing everything we can now to ensure the Russian programme against adversity in the future.

To address and preempt the long-term vulnerabilities of disposition, a discussion of conditionality should be joined to the negotiation for a Multilateral Agreement.

Conditionality should also be built into talks on the entity that is to manage the programme in Russia. Let's call this the Multinational Management Corporation or MMC. The aim, to be discussed later in this study, should be to institutionalize conditionality in the MMC as the body which directs the work of disposition out to the very end of the job.

As well, we might now identify an alternative, or at the very least a supplement, to the add-on approach. Let us call it proactive conditionality.

Thinking Proactively

Add-on thinking and practice are concerned primarily with achieving an agreement that safeguards one's interests and reputation against future eventualities. The agreement is intended to order the future to the extent possible. Once it's in hand, the parties move on to other matters. If things go wrong in the implementation, everyone is protected, for example by provisions governing liability, taxation, intellectual property rights, or nuclear safety.

This is by no means to suggest that a practice of add-on conditionality is purely self-regarding, or simply a means of minimizing responsibility and the need to remain engaged. Irreversibility, for instance, is and will continue to be viewed as vitally important by all concerned. They can be expected to monitor performance out to the last kilo in seeing to it that dispositioned WGPu is not returned to military use.

Nevertheless, under an add-on approach to conditionality the parties do not start with an agreed set of criteria and then evaluate the technical and financial options accordingly. Instead, hardware and money matters tend to drive a discussion that is only secondarily modulated by safety, environmental, or irreversibility criteria. The parties proceed pragmatically. They ensure that the work of disposition meets various conditions which are alluded to as the need arises, but without formal consideration of each separately or of interconnections and priorities amongst them. Indeed, this is pretty well the way things are normally done in multilateral negotiation. But international support for disposition of excess Russian WGPu is not a normal undertaking.