

door must be left open to negotiate a micro-disarmament element at a later date. When a peace agreement includes micro-disarmament it must be clearly addressed in the mandate. Subsequent mandate renewals must continue to address the issue. UN orders to Force Commanders must be clear and unequivocal on implementation procedures and Force Commanders must have the wherewithal in resources (human, technical and financial) to implement the decisions. Implementation must be firm, fair and universal in its application, preferably under centralized direction. As well, micro-disarmament will normally have to address demobilization and resettlement taking into consideration the uniqueness of the conflict and the culture of the belligerents. Above all there will have to be security guarantees that are enforceable.

Enforcement operations, UN sanctioned or mounted, are not necessarily predicated on a peace agreement although generally some form of acquiescence on the part of warring parties is required before such an operation is mounted. In this case, the mandate becomes the key issue. At the very least the mandate must address the issue of micro-disarmament so that the Force Commander knows what to do with weapons seized or acquired otherwise. Whether light weapons are taken by force, voluntarily handed over, collected as part of a peace agreement, collected through a reward and penalty system, or in any combination of the foregoing, a UN force must have clear directions on collection, safekeeping and disposal. In the case of peace enforcement operations, it is conceivable that the initial mandate may not address the issue due to a requirement to launch a force quickly. If that is the case then there should be sufficient flexibility to permit the Force Commander to initiate his own weapon collection and destruction program through force or negotiation with the warring parties, or to seek additional direction or mandate amendment from the Security-Council.

As noted before, it is recommended that negotiation guidelines be formulated for third party facilitators undertaking peace negotiations on behalf of warring parties. The production of such guidelines could be done by the UN Secretariat or an ad hoc group established for that purpose. The next step would be to produce guidelines or operating procedures for UN mission commanders on implementing micro-disarmament. Both these guidelines would have to be considered by the UN Security Council when developing a mandate for a UN Mission, particularly with regards to resources.

Second, while firearms regulation and enforcement is a national responsibility, the UN, regional organizations or other facilitators should be prepared to provide advice when it is sought. Whether the advice is tendered through a formal or a more informal process (for example; The Sahara-Sahel Mission or The International Commission of Inquiry for Rwanda), it should have the requisite makeup to provide legal, customs and enforcement advice. It should also be able to recommend what financial or other resource assistance such as training is required to help establish a regulatory and enforcement capability. Too often it is forgotten that states need both financial resources and expert advice to combat the proliferation of light weapons and the forces that demand them. In this regard, there may be value in establishing an ad hoc committee or panel within the UN that draws on both arms