

general scheme, contain cases decided within two or more years prior to the date of publication.

The general plan of the work may be briefly outlined as follows: The text of the treatise is printed in bold and legible type, while the numerous authorities illustrating it are placed in foot notes. These notes contain not merely the names of cases, but very frequently full extracts from the judgments; a very useful feature. The reader, who may have only a limited library, is thus put in possession of the gist of the authorities upon which the author relies. In some instances a vigorous criticism accompanies the citation; see for examples *Webster v. Foley*, 21 S.C.R. 580, at p. 1983, etc., and *Sim v. Dominion Fish Company*, 2 O.L.R. 69, at p. 1975. Reference is made to all the reports, official and otherwise, in which cases may be found.

The first 33 chapters are devoted to a discussion of the general principles (apart from statute) governing the liability of a master for injuries to a servant. The questions as to what degree of care a master is bound to exercise for the protection of his servant, and what kind of instrumentalities he is bound to furnish are carefully considered and the cases bearing on them are fully discussed.

Chapter seven contains an interesting consideration of the moot point as to how far a servant's knowledge or ignorance of the risks involved in the employment affects the master's liability.

The cases on this point are by no means consistent. Mr. Labatt criticises the opposing theories in an instructive manner. The doctrine, "first announced in all its repulsive nakedness by the late Lord Bramwell," that no negligence is predicable of the master where the servant knows and appreciates the risk to which he is exposed, the inevitable conclusion of which is that "as to any servant who understands the conditions and the risks arising therefrom, a master may, without being affected with legal culpability, carry on his business with instrumentalities that are defective and in bad repair, and by methods which are abnormally dangerous," is justly characterised as being economic rather than juristic and as inconsistent with a true conception of public policy, and "repugnant to the unsophisticated mind of the average layman." In a note to sec. 62, p. 156, the author refers to "one of the most amusing instances on record of the inability of some reporters to estimate the comparative importance of decisions."