

The same considerations, that is, the establishment of confidence and the gaining of experience in methods of inspection and supervision, apply to measures for the prevention of surprise attack. My Delegation sincerely regrets that the negotiations on this matter, in which Canada was participating, were suspended at the end of last year, for reasons which have already been made known. We consider those negotiations should be resumed and hope that the creation of the ten-power Committee will provide an opportunity for further consideration of measures for preventing or controlling the danger of surprise attack.

Several delegations have already made in the present debate suggestions concerning matters which might appropriately be taken up by the Disarmament Commission. I am thinking in particular of the questions suggested by the distinguished Representative of the U.S.A. concerning institutions to preserve international peace and security and to promote the rule of law when all nations will have laid down their arms. Specifically he asked what type of international force should be established, what principles of international law would govern the use of such a force and what internal security forces, in precise terms, would be required by the nations of the world if existing armaments were abolished. In addition the distinguished Representative of Italy has reminded us that total and general disarmament would imply revision of those provisions of the Charter which assumed that we might achieve partial but not total disarmament and which therefore presupposed the existence of national forces which could be placed at the disposal of the United Nations when needed for the maintenance of peace.

These are big and fundamental questions, which would have to be looked into by the international community in connection with discussion of means to achieve the goal of total disarmament. The Disarmament Commission of the General Assembly would seem to be an appropriate body to consider such matters. In this connection it would seem necessary to give careful attention to each of the interim stages on the path to total disarmament. During this period it is evident, as has been stated by several representatives, that progress in disarmament would be greatly facilitated by the development of effective institutions for collective security. This is a good time for the United Nations to take a fresh look at the provisions of the Charter in this respect. The collapse 12 years ago of the negotiations leading to measures for implementing Article 43 was due to reasons which were both political and technical. In the present political atmosphere, it may be that some of the technical reasons for the collapse - such as factors relating to disproportions in forces of various types - are no longer as relevant as they were. It may be timely therefore to re-examine together the relevant provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. In any event, during the period while national forces