

3. deterrence, stabilization and the provision of security during the normalization of political life;
4. confidence-building between communities in conflict;
5. transitional economic assistance to wean societies away from relief dependency;
6. assistance in the rebuilding of state structures damaged by war;
7. assistance in the construction of political institutions that will enjoy the trust of the parties and will provide reassurance as they contemplate re-integration into politics and society;
8. electoral assistance as divided societies choose new representative governments.

In the extreme, it may involve the suspension of discredited institutions and the assumption of direct policy and administrative responsibility by international agencies in the transition from war to peace, as has occurred to varying degrees in both Bosnia and Kosovo.

The multi-dimensional character of peace-building raises difficult questions about the sustainability of the boundaries between the human dimension, the economic dimension and the security dimension of OSCE approaches to security. Clearly, in the area of conflict management and resolution (and, for that matter, conflict prevention), they overlap. The effort to sustain their separation in institutional terms (as with the FSC focus on politico-military aspects of security) seems somewhat artificial and is perhaps debilitating.

The multidimensionality of peace-building also poses a number of challenges related to the division of labour amongst states, inter-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations and the co-ordination of their activities in the field. There is as yet no generally agreed distribution of responsibilities for these activities in the OSCE space. It is not clear what institution should be responsible for delineating such responsibilities. It is clear that the roles and the aspirations of many of these institutions overlap.

Turning to institutional roles (within the OSCE) in the regulation of conflict, matters relating to the prevention of ethnic conflict in OSCE member states are generally handled through the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in the broader context of the Human Dimension. Matters relating to OSCE engagement in the management and resolution of civil conflict are generally addressed in the Permanent Council and the Secretariat. In contrast, there is little evidence of efforts to engage these issues in the FSC. This presumably reflects the sensitivity of the group to OSCE norms concerning non-interference in domestic jurisdiction, in particular on matters relating to regime change and territorial integrity, as well as the consensually based modes of decision in the organization.

One might ask whether the FSC **should** engage issues related to peace-building and conflict prevention, given the existence of alternative institutions with reasonably clearly defined practical responsibilities for dealing with them. This is a fair question, given legitimate concerns about overlap and duplication. But it bears stressing that the mandates of institutions such as ODIHR or HCNM (and for that matter the missions of long term duration), are operational rather than analytical