

To pursue these issues effectively, **deficiencies in interdepartmental dialogue and liaison must be remedied.** Routine contacts between CIC and DFAIT on migration issues work adequately, though the DFAIT unit concerned is rather small and much preoccupied with other matters, so that it has little time for consideration of longer-term trends. Contacts are satisfactory between CIC and CIDA on specific matters such as cooperation with the UNHCR in places like Bosnia. But there does not seem to be systematic and high-level dialogue on broader topics between CIC and CIDA, as recommended five years ago. And there is no dialogue at all between CIC and those responsible for trade policy in DFAIT and the Department of Finance, with the result that the latter two are little sensitised to the basic contradictions or awkwardnesses between the growing free movement in goods and capital, and the continuing obstacles to the freer movement of most kinds of labour, as discussed in Part II (see page 38). The same dichotomy is evident among Canadian academics; migration and trade experts live in different worlds. There can be no question now of altering basic policies, but we should begin to look to the remoter future, and encourage others to do likewise.

(ii) Strategy: Protection "of those in need—refugees and those in refugee-like situations", by

"maintaining our refugee status determination system, working actively with the UNHCR to ensure humanitarian responses, and enhancing international cooperation for the protection of the rights of people who are forced to flee from their homes";
 encouraging resettlement to provide protection for those who cannot avail themselves of "voluntary repatriation or local integration";
 emphasising the needs of refugee women as a priority, and promoting our own gender-based persecution guidelines for refugees at the UNHCR, noting that such guidelines were recognised at the Beijing conference.

Comment: Canada's record in this field is a creditable one, despite the keen criticisms of some Canadian NGOs and academic specialists. The main problem concerns the rate of acceptance by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) of claims for refugee status. Of the 27,000 to 30,000 claims made in Canada each year, about 20% are withdrawn before a hearing, 30-35% are rejected, and the remaining 45-50% are accepted (or, on the stricter yes-or-no basis used internationally, 56% or more "Yes", to 44% or less "No"). **This rate is considerably higher than that of any other country, and has changed little since five years ago.** Among a number of reasons given to explain the high level positively are that:

- (a) an IRB panel, as a quasi-judicial body, must give the benefit of the doubt to claimants, as the UNHCR itself says it should, and accordingly does not need to "go to the outer limit of evidential proof";
- (b) in our system, if the two-person panel disagrees, the claim is accepted;
- (c) other countries are slower, unreasonably demanding of specific evidence of persecution from vulnerable claimants, or less sensitive to human rights considerations;