

Thus, the conceptual treatment of confidence building in this review amounts to an analytic reconstruction of the historical-operational experience of confidence building. Although a conceptual reconstruction must be true to the policy examples from which its essence is induced, it should not be limited to simply reproducing the explicit, superficial content of confidence building agreements or the dated thinking that initially informed their pursuit. The reconstruction's "allegiance" must be to the actual nature of the phenomenon, as best as we can divine it, which can mean going beyond what analysts and policy makers may once have believed about the limits and nature of the phenomenon.

Conclusion

One of the major underlying themes in this review is the proposition that confidence building can now be recognized as something larger, more complex, and more powerful than policy makers and analysts appreciated at the time they began to negotiate confidence building agreements over twenty years ago in the CSCE/OSCE context.

The "something larger" is not at dramatic odds with the "minimalist" policy conception, which often spoke (albeit imprecisely) about *changing perceptions*. However, the transformation view does expand upon some previously unappreciated aspects of confidence building and recognizes it as an evolving, dynamic phenomenon of greater complexity and potential power than was once understood. In particular, the capacity to help restructure increasingly unsatisfactory security relations will likely emerge as an important and under-appreciated dimension of successful confidence building.

As we explore — and attempt to apply — this important security management approach, particularly in new application contexts, we will doubtless continue to revise our understanding. However, this important undertaking will be handicapped if we continue to be constrained by limited conceptions of what confidence building is and how it works.

ENDNOTES

1. For instance, although the fine essays by Rolf Berg and Adam-Daniel Rotfeld undertook some conceptual exploration, the overall result was not conceptually-oriented. See Allen Lynch (ed.) *Building Security in Europe Confidence-Building Measures and the CSCE* (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies (East-West Monograph Series Number Two), 1986). The same could be said of other work during the period up to and including the conclusion of the Stockholm agreement. Insights during this time seemed to be driven by operational CBM accomplishments or prospects, a habit of thought that tended to constrain conceptual thinking.

2. From the vantage point of 1996, it would be fair to say that a review of the pre-1984 professional literature reveals hints of a somewhat fuller appreciation on the part of some analysts of what confidence building might entail as a process capable of altering fundamental views about unfriendly or traditionally hostile neighbours. These insights, nevertheless, are fragmentary and never contributed to a sustained and focused effort to explain how confidence building as a process might function.

3. A partial exception to this general trend is Richard E. Darilek, "Confidence Building and Arms Control in the East-West Context: Lessons from the Cold-War Experience in Europe," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, vol. IV, no. 2 (Winter 1993). Another exception of quite a different sort is Volker Rittberger, Manfred Efinger and Martin Mendler, "Confidence- and security-building measures: an evolving East-West security regime?" in Hans Rattinger and David Dewitt, eds. *Canadian and German Perspectives on East-West Arms Control*. (London: Routledge, 1992). It is worth noting that the focus in this piece is on security regimes and not on confidence building, *per se*.

Nevertheless, the vast majority of analysts working with confidence building, although very capable in other regards, simply do not appear to regard confidence building to be a phenomenon worthy of particularly rigorous inquiry or exploration. They seem to resist seeing any significant connection between