

recommendation, refused to endorse it.

The author claims that Canadian-Soviet relations are governed by four imperatives: national security, trade, Canada-US relations and consular cum human rights issues engendered by Canada's significant Jewish, Ukrainian and East European populations. He emphasizes that in Soviet eyes, Canadian relations are secondary to Soviet-US relations. During his service in Moscow, Ford was concerned about Prime Minister Trudeau's "fascination" with and unpredictable reactions to the Soviets. From time to time, Trudeau would stroll over to the Soviet residence in Rockcliffe in the evenings for private conversations with the Soviet Ambassador.

This book is well organized: five major headings cover Stalin and his successors; the Soviets' view of the West; domestic and frontier problems; detente and the Gorbachev generation. Unfortunately, what is missing is a synopsis of government structure in the context of the interplay of the party bosses, the KGB, the military and GRU within the military. The author could have better described and evaluated the significance of Andropov's role in setting up the Gorbachev succession. In addition, the huge Soviet military establishment might have been described and evaluated as a political force. Nonetheless, the book is a valuable contribution to Kremlin lore, and contains important warnings about handling the Soviets on both national and individual levels. — *George Hampson*
George Hampson is a retired Canadian diplomat

Minds at War: Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflicts of Defense Policymakers
Steven Kull

New York: Basic Books Ltd., 1988, 341 pgs., US \$ 19.95 cloth

Why have US defence decision makers pursued policies and capabilities for fighting and winning a nuclear war despite the existence of considerable commentary suggesting that victory is unattainable? Why have they displayed continual concern with maintaining the strategic balance when

possession of secure second-strike capabilities by both superpowers affords each the ability to destroy the other regardless of the weapons each possesses beyond that point? Why do they develop nuclear systems capable of destroying hardened targets when technology now affords the Soviet Union the ability to launch their land-based missiles "out from under" an incoming attack? These and related questions lie at the heart of this original and well-written study of the thinking of defence policy makers.

Relying upon interviews with eighty-four past and present members of the US defence community, Kull launches into a detailed exploration of the rationales offered for the character of US nuclear policy. At times, the justifications are military in nature, with respondents arguing that only by possessing effective war-fighting, war-winning capabilities can the US deter Soviet aggression, or terminate a nuclear conflict on terms favourable to the US should deterrence fail. However, Kull notes that more often US policy is justified on the basis of a need to manipulate the peacetime perceptions of allies and adversaries about US resolve and the credibility of its nuclear threats. Indeed, the author's depiction of the various twists and turns official rationalizations can take is exceedingly rich in detail and a valuable reference source for anyone interested in the psychology of nuclear threats.

Kull also provides interpretations of the rationalizations he so effectively depicts. A psychologist and clinical therapist, the author's principal concern lies in how defence policy makers cope with the reality of mutual vulnerability that nuclear weapons impose upon them. Here, Kull offers an explanation for the behaviour of his subjects.

On the one hand, he observes that they often engage in a process of "denial" — ignoring nuclear reality and treating nuclear weapons much like conventional ones. On the other hand, the denial is rarely constant. At times, respondents

seem fully aware of the fundamental changes nuclear weapons imply for strategy. This leads Kull to view defence decision makers as torn by an inner conflict resulting from their adherence to two contradictory lines of reasoning, one denying nuclear reality, the other seeking to adapt to it. Moreover, when Kull confronts his subjects with this contradiction, he finds that they offer different justifications for US policy. More precisely, they put forth justifications based on a desire to gratify certain collective psychological needs. Kull contends that these desires and the need to satisfy them underlie the more common, security-oriented rationalizations for nuclear policy which defence decision makers offer, and may in fact constitute that policy's motivating force.

Kull's explanations for nuclear rationalization are intriguing, however, but his study contains problems which tend to weaken the argument. It is difficult to establish the extent to which the responses obtained reflect the true beliefs of his subjects. When Kull confronts them with the contradictions inherent in their arguments, it is hard to know whether their new rationalizations are fulfilling deep-seated psychological needs, or are employed as a means of bringing the interview to a speedy conclusion.

There are also questions regarding Kull's views of nuclear reality. While the author contends that his respondents sometimes seemed aware of the revolutionary impact of nuclear weapons on strategy, military officials are under-represented in his sample. Yet it is these individuals who are most likely to present the strongest case for the acquisition of nuclear war-fighting capabilities, and most likely to resist the reality Kull claims is so pervasive.

While Kull's arguments may not be fully convincing, he does succeed in demonstrating the potential that inter-disciplinary approaches hold for the development of novel insights into defence decision-making. — *Peter Gizewski*

Mr. Gizewski is a doctoral candidate at Columbia University and a research assistant at the Institute.

BRIEFLY NOTED

Middle Powers in the International System

This is a series of five policy studies from a research project jointly funded by CIIPS and the Donner Canadian Foundation. Four of the titles are published by the North-South Institute; the fifth is published by CIIPS. Please note that the titles are available only from their respective publishers.

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The United Nations and Its Finances: A Test for Middle Powers
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The above titles are published by the North-South Institute, the price of the first title is \$7.50, the others cost \$10.50.

Non-Nuclear Powers and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament: A Study in Multilateral Arms Control
Michael Tucker

CIIPS Occasional Paper Number 7, free (également disponible en français)

The Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism and Patriotism

R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong

Wichester, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1989, 274 pgs., US \$24.95 cloth

An examination of the origins of war in light of the authors' assessment of the human "propensity" for warfare. The book challenges contemporary theories of warfare and shows why "existing peace initiatives are inept."

(The study on which this book is based was financed in part by a grant from CIIPS) □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in the *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.