

## Beatty Named External Affairs Minister

On June 25, the Honourable Perrin Beatty, MP for Wellington-Grey-Dufferin-Simcoe, was named Secretary of State for External Affairs. He replaces the Honourable Barbara McDougall, who had held the post since April 1991.

Mr. Beatty was born in Toronto in 1950 and educated at James McQueen Public School, Fergus, Upper Canada College and the University of Western Ontario. He was first elected to the House of Commons in 1972. In 1979, he became the youngest cabinet minister to that point in Canadian history, serving as Minister of State for the Treasury Board. Since then, Mr. Beatty has held a number of Cabinet posts, serving variously as Minister of National Revenue and Minister Responsible for Canada Post Corporation, Solicitor General of Canada, Minister of National Defence, Minister of National Health and Welfare and, most recently, Minister of Communications.



*The Honourable Perrin Beatty*

US also announced that it planned to initiate discussions with the other nuclear weapon states on modalities and objectives of negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty. France, the UK and China have responded positively. These announcements are indeed welcome developments and they bode well for an early start to CTBT negotiations....

Canada favours negotiations towards a CTBT in a multilateral forum such as the Conference on Disarmament, at the same time realizing that such negotiations must be predicated upon the kind of political will and leadership that has been demonstrated last month by the nuclear weapon states. It is essential, therefore, that the CD take stock of its own resources and expertise which might contribute towards facilitating successful negotiation of a CTBT. The international community must make its contribution to a strong and effective CTBT. The final agreement must be open to signature by all and contain strong verification procedures. This process would, in our view, increase in credibility and international acceptance if the CD could agree to expand its membership to include all those wishing to be members.

Canada is pleased with the positive and constructive responses of the other nuclear weapon states to President Clinton's important initiative. We also urge them to continue their existing moratoria on nuclear testing. There is no reason why we cannot launch these negotiations now and my government supports initiatives to review at an early stage the mandate of the nuclear test ban *ad hoc* committee in order for it to negotiate a CTB. We are now engaged in the NPT extension process and an early start to CTB negotiations would give an important psychological boost to a successful NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.

On June 3, 1993, our Swedish colleagues made a valuable contribution through their tabling of a revised version of a draft CTBT, which builds upon CD/1089 of July 25, 1991. In our view, the Swedish papers provide focus to certain key issues, while recognizing that many details will need to be filled in once negotiations get underway. It is always useful to have at hand a significant body of relevant information to facilitate the negotiations, especially when this includes a vision of what the end-product might comprise.

There is, of course, a wealth of material upon which to draw. All of the attention now being directed to non-seismic technologies, and to their potential to play a supportive

role in a verification regime, can only be helpful to the elaboration of a treaty that can be effectively verified. The Canadian position is that the elements of any verification regime are already very well-defined, based on the work of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE), and could be put in place within a reasonable period of time.

In this regard, we note that the last GSE report to the CD (CD/1185, March 2, 1993), based on earlier tests and their evaluations, elaborated a concept of a system for international seismic data exchange which would provide states with data and information to meet their national CTB verification needs. The GSE is now moving through the design stage with the aim of beginning global testing of the proposed concept at an early date.

Canada fully supports this effort by the GSE and its contributing participants. In our understanding, this would not be another test to compile data along the lines of the two that have already taken place, in 1984 and 1991. It would, in fact, constitute the initial phase of establishing the architecture that could then be called upon to serve the needs of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

It is also the Canadian view that our current deliberations and future negotiations must continue to include the contributions that other, non-seismic technologies can make to CTB verification. Let me be clear on this point. While it is our position that all of these various options are on the table and merit serious consideration, they should not constrain our rapid progress to conclude a comprehensive test ban. In fact, it is our firm belief that a package of seismic and non-seismic verification measures could be put together and be ready to go within a relatively short period of time.

As an active participant in the GSE, Canada supports the role proposed for a seismic monitoring network, although a number of the parameters of the network will need further refinement as the work of the GSE progresses. Furthermore, Canada supports continued exploration in the CD of the relevance of the methodology and the parameters of a hypothetical network for radionuclides monitoring.

The 1991 Swedish draft text identifies the important role that imagery from "available satellite systems" would serve for CTBT verification. Canada strongly endorses such a monitoring system; delegations will remember that the May 1993