

fore no special faculty of conscience as a matter of pronouncing judgments merely. As to what is to be done, custom, environment and education are all concerned in the final judgment which is nothing but the weighing of evidence in the particular cases.

There is also a second feature, namely, the sentiment of moral approbation or disapprobation following upon the contemplation of some deed or course of conduct as an accomplished fact and as respects its moral character, and this sentiment is not the same as that of obligation although dependent upon it; an examination of the individual consciousness shows that the "ought feeling" and the feeling of moral approbation are attached without any intellectual process intervening, to a so-called moral judgment, but in making up the judgment any amount of reasoning upon evidence is admissible.*

(b) Such are the factors which a psychological analysis of the moral consciousness reveals. A still further question is: are moral obligation and the feeling of approval or disapproval derived or underived? i. e., are the factors of the moral consciousness above presented a product or original in character? Many empiricists reply that the moral sentiments are derived. This empirical theory holds that the history of the moral consciousness has three stages. In the first "there is an association being continually formed and strengthened between our actions and the pleasant or painful feelings which they entail." This results in an inducement to do what brings pleasure and to avoid what produces pain. In the second stage of the development of the moral consciousness "this inducement derives a new character of obligation from the authoritative commands of external government, with the punishment which that government is accustomed to inflict for disobedience. In the third stage this consciousness of obligation reaches its complete development by attaining an insight into the reason of external commands and thus enabling us to feel that certain actions are obligatory for reasons which are independent of their being enforced by an external power."†

Prof. Murray criticises this theory of the moral consciousness on the ground that in the second stage, the assumption is

*G. T. Ladd, "Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory," p. 579, ff.

†Murray's *Handbook of Ethics*, p. 50, 51.