the A srael raised objections with the stillrity Courive Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice on on ommission, established by UNTSO in al; at 48 arguing that Palestinian guerillas raised fould not be allowed into the area, that of agree frontier should be kept open to allow ns in recontact between Israel and the Mar-Secretalite-controlled areas and that Maronite or a rafficers should not be punished for their respondiance of the Lebanese Government and April NIFIL. Nevertheless, a Lebanese Gover cent nment battalion, apparently under Syr-Elemein escort, moved towards a Maronite nian assition in a village policed by UN troops. area. he Maronites, however, held firm. Fears was alere expressed that the Syrians would ere outlin entry into the area, and the Syrian the macort was withdrawn. On this occasion, he retue UN acted as intermediary between Lebande Lebanese and the Maronites. Howresolver, fighting broke out between them and not to mid-August the Lebanese battalion long bandoned its efforts to enter the area. but leminiscent of August 1960, when the jor Saumumba Government of the Congo tried rce, wi follow ONUC (the United Nations and peration in the Congo) into secessionist or a timatanga but was thwarted by the UN If of threes, the Lebanese Government gave followonsideration to the redefinition of the to banited Nations role to permit the use of over three if necessary to dislodge the Maronite Christialitia and allow the entry of Government nd of threes. But no action of this kind was taken. There was also the human problem o acce y. Theith which UNIFIL had to deal, since

There was also the human problem by. The which UNIFIL had to deal, since mit telative stability had been achieved in the and, outh after the total withdrawal of Israeli reds orces. Many of the 250,000 Lebanese, lestine actuding about 65,000 Palestinians, who UNIFIED the battle-zone upon the Israeli invalor of fooion, began streaming back into a zone where towns were smashed or obliterated

regically war, where food was difficult to obtain JNIF and normal services disrupted or entirely introl inavailable. UNIFIL was called upon to dethe egulate the flow, filter out dissident elelook nents, curtail internecine struggles and, athoriwith the help of a special humanitarian ebane und established earlier by the Secretarytion General, do all it could to help provide 20. The basic human needs for a population oke oravaged by war.

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ensuit At the time of writing, the original man-Chridate has been renewed for a further four angis months. However, determined efforts by

Lebanese forces to enter southern Lebanon have been forcibly repulsed, UNIFIL has yet to fulfil the second half of its mandate. the establishment of its full control over the area of operations and the return of Lebanese forces. But, with the political turmoil and frequent hostilities raging in the north and with powerful Syrian forces entrenched on Lebanese soil, UNIFIL also serves as a buffer and as a deterrent to any attempt by the PLO or Syria to disrupt progress of the Camp David framework for peace by moving hostile forces close to the Israeli border. This is a silent aspect of the mandate, not to be found in Security Council resolutions.

There can also be no doubt that UNIFIL, in the implementation of Resolution 425, functions at a high level of continuous and critical political involvement. Its role is broader than the forms of interposition of UNEF and UNDOF, and well beyond the limited observation of UNOGIL. It can be likened to the complexity of ONUC, but without the attendant political confusion and financial burden that threatened to wreck the UN. On the contrary, UNIFIL adds to the competence and prestige of the organization.

It may be argued that, in the present era of search for détente, UN peacekeeping is less subject to the hostile criticism and partisanship that characterized the period of the Cold War. Soviet restraint and French participation are testimony to this view. The successes of UNEF, UNDOF and UNOGIL also provide the legitimacy to the conception of UN peacekeeping that may carry it to the next stage of agreement in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on the standards, planning, control and infrastructure of peacekeeping for future operations.

As for UNIFIL, it will be some time before its full effects can be assessed. It will certainly face serious tests in the foreseeable future. And, unless the Camp David framework for peace is expanded to include all Israel's neighbours, the need for its existence will continue. But peace-keeping is a vital part of the long and precarious path to peace. There should be no doubt that, in this case, peacekeeping and peacemaking are inextricably combined. Any echoes of past voices that criticize peacekeeping for failures in the process of peacemaking have no relevance to the contemporary situation.

High level of political involvement for UNIFIL