

anxieties. He said that he would like to explain the steps which were now contemplated by the United Kingdom Government to ensure that effective prior consultation with the Allies principally concerned should in practice be provided for. In this connection he referred me to paragraph 4 of telegram No. 97 from the Dominions Office to the Canadian Government. Sir William explained that he thought the first step should be to invite the Allied Governments most directly affected to submit their views as to the Surrender Terms for Germany, but without communicating the text to them at this stage. Sir William defined the "Allied Governments most directly affected" as the European Allies. The phrase, of course, includes the Dominions, who were, indeed in a preferential position as they had already seen the text of the Draft Instrument.

The next step would be when a text had been agreed upon by the European Advisory Commission and was ready to be recommended to the Governments represented upon it, to explain that such a text would be subject to modification in the light of any views which the other Allied Governments might express.

In any case, it was Sir William's view, and the view of the United Kingdom Government, that the Allied Governments most directly affected should not only see the text but give their assent to it. The other Allied Governments should, he thought, be shown the text for their information.

Sir William said that these proposals were now before the European Advisory Commission, and he was pressing hard for their acceptance. He was getting full support from the United States Government and from Mr. Winant personally. Mr. Winant's instructions in this connection from his Government were similar to Sir William's own. Sir William thought that the United States Government were sensitive to any criticism that the interests of the European Allies might be being neglected, or that a big-Power hegemony was being established, and they were anxious to avoid giving any such impression. The Russians, on the other hand, had been very reluctant to depart in any measure from the tripartite basis, but he thought, although he did not wish to be too optimistic, that they were beginning to move in the right direction.

I then called Sir William's attention to the suggestion contained in paragraph 6 of our telegram No. 106 of the 16th June to the effect that a satisfactory solution might be found by the Supreme Commanders receiving authority from the Governments concerned to exercise command over the various forces comprising their Commands, and then the Instrument of Surrender could be regarded as part of their exercise of that authority.

I also described the relationship of the Canadian Government and Armed Forces to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to the Supreme Allied Commanders, and mentioned the Canadian Government's decision to communicate to the Allied Commanders in Chief to the effect that they exercise command over the Canadian Armed Forces in their theatres with the full authority of the Canadian Government. I rather got the impression that Sir William had not had an opportunity to give very full consideration to the Canadian Government's

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