

Then I must ask the question, was it just bad bookkeeping which made the minister ask for \$489 million, of which he required only \$376 million?

With regard to the changes in policy which have been announced either in the press or in the house during the course of the year, the outstanding one is the combining of the three defence departments under one minister, and that is a sound and practical course to have followed and is in accordance with the lessons learned during the two world wars in which the armed forces of Canada have played their share. I can speak for this party when I say that the opposition approves the amalgamation of the three services under one minister of defence, because that is a course which various members on this side of the house have recommended on several occasions. Experience indicates the necessity of a central organization for defence. One of the reasons which contributed to the unpreparedness of Great Britain in 1939 was the absence of a guiding hand to formulate a unified defence policy for the three services. There was no provision to ensure that, if war came, that country would be ready in all the important aspects to meet the situation. The weakness was not remedied merely by the appointment of a minister for coordination of defence. It is now an indisputable fact that no operation of war can be carried out by one of the fighting services unaided by one or both of the others. Any weakness or failure in any one of the elements, be it sea, land or air, invariably produces a profoundly adverse effect upon the prospects of success in the other. These truths are so self-evident that they need no elaboration.

The old conception of a sea power, a land power or an air power as being in some way independent of each other is now quite obsolete. They are totally interdependent. If we have not learned that lesson now; if we must wait for some future enemy to teach it to us over again, we shall probably perish in the attempt; yet nothing in the announced proposed post-war organization of the defence forces of Canada indicates that this government has learned that vital lesson or has really taken it to heart. When that lesson was applied during the war it showed conclusively that for success the command and direction of all the armed forces has to be unified at the top; there had to be unity of command, not only of all the forces of any one nation, but of all the forces of all the allied nations in each theatre of war. For each particular operation of war, whether it was the battle of the Atlantic, the landing in Normandy or the capture of Okinawa or

in any other of the Pacific islands, a task force was designed and assembled. To each such task force a commander was appointed, and to him were allotted all the armed forces needed to do the job, although these forces did include elements from all the three armed services, the ships, the transport, the aircraft, the tanks, the artillery, the infantry and all the manifold services of supply and maintenance. Until this unification of command was achieved catastrophe followed after disaster. Once this unification was brought about, victory followed victory until the final conclusion of the war. But in spite of the lessons learned at such stupendous cost, when the reorganization of the armed forces of Canada was undertaken after the war the principle of unity of planning and direction was thrown into the discard. Though the services are now under one minister, each service still retains its independence in matters of organization, training, equipment and, to a very large extent administration. Surely the logical development of that close relationship which was built up during the war between the sea, land and air forces, demands greater unification than is now given to it in this country. As a means also of giving fuller play to scientific developments a much closer amalgamation is definitely indicated.

As if existing conditions were not bad enough, a clumsy and expensive attempt has been made to achieve some sort of outward semblance of unity in the Department of National Defence by superimposing upon the navy, army and air force headquarters an enlarged civil service under a deputy minister, with associate deputies, assistants and a numerous civil staff. At the head of each service is a chief of staff. Besides these three, and of equal status, is the director general of defence research. These officers form the chiefs of staff committee whose function is to advise the government on defence policies. They are the professional military advisers of the government.

The organization of national defence in its broader aspect, which should include plans for mobilizing the nation's resources, both civil and military, remains seemingly forgotten. I might refer to it as the forgotten factor. This requires the collaboration of nearly every government department and is concerned, not only with the interrelationship of the three fighting services and their supply, with scientific research and civil defence, but also with the preparation of plans for the country's transition from peace to war. Because these problems are the concern of the government as a whole, a defence committee under the authority of the cabinet, somewhat sim-