

Then the government appointed Air Marshal Slemon as Deputy Commander of NORAD. The Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of Defence of the United States thereupon announced on August 1, 1957, the agreement of the two governments to the setting up of a system of integrated operational control of the air defence forces of Canada and the United States under an integrated command responsible to the chiefs of staff of both countries.

When the exact terms of defence of the command are finally settled, they will reflect the chain of command outlined in the statement of August 1. The military commanders, in turn, as all members are aware, are subject to their respective civilian authorities.

I would say this in closing this part of my opening statement, that I hope what I have said will clear away, in the minds of members of the committee, any doubts which may have existed as to the necessity of this new command. I must say that I did not think there were any doubts in that regard as to the government's attempt to meet what it, in unison with the United States government, agreed was a problem requiring urgent attention.

Once again I trust that the detailed matters to which I have been speaking of a military nature which may yet be in the minds of members of the committee will be taken up with the Minister of National Defence. And I would hope, subject to security provisions, that it would be possible to lay before the house the notes that will be prepared and exchanged, and if that be your wish, I would be happy to answer questions in the house in that context.

Another short statement with your indulgence: I was somewhat concerned about the headlines which I saw in a newspaper relating to my observations on east-west relations.

I did not incorporate into my statement before the committee some of the things I endeavoured to say in the House of Commons in my maiden speech, and I am not discounting—I am not relenting on the view that I expressed; but those headlines indicated—or seemed to carry the suggestion—that we would be subservient to any proposal in the context.

I would repeat again our genuine and sustained interest in finding peaceful solutions to the issues which divide us from the communist world, and I repeat what I said: "No sane person could run the risk of shutting any promising door on the possibility of coexistence", and in expressing agreement on the necessity for the negotiation of problems that divide the two worlds as and when opportunity affords or may be created for that purpose, I think of all those who did express agreement that we can advance a solution of some of the problems. But I would remind the members of the committee of what I said—that we must keep our powder dry—and this does not—I repeat—it does not discount or subtract from this considered proposal on my part. We should have a long period of preparation or a period sufficiently long for preparation on the part of the east and west. Some of the leaders might meet. Naturally we would not be falling into a trap of propaganda. None of us would want to see happen again the complacency that struck the west—overcame the west one might nearly say—after the Geneva Conference. I did say in my speech in the house that we would have to have some assurance—that is, an assurance which we could count upon—that the Soviet bloc would cease in their attempts to dominate the smaller countries and dominate other people.

I was asked a question the other day and I am grateful for the anticipation of that question. May I read it you: About an exchange of information on atomic energy and the work of the international atomic energy agency; and about the Middle East with particular reference to the cost of UNEF and the clearance of the Suez Canal, disarmament and nuclear tests, and economic