

Your Committee's primary concern, in this regard, is that a Canadian decision against renewing the Agreement with the United States could create doubt as to Canada's reliability and even its friendliness, with long-term effects that are difficult to gauge but impossible to ignore. Professor Cox suggested a comparison of such a situation with the after effects of Canada's decision to withdraw half of its NATO forces from Europe in 1969. That decision had little effect on the military strength of the Western alliance. There is reason to believe, however, that the decision and the rhetoric which accompanied it gave rise to doubts, in European minds, about Canada's commitment to Alliance solidarity and the extent of Canada's continuing interest in Western Europe. While the unilateral reduction of Canada's NATO forces in Europe did not lead to a falling out with our allies in Europe, it may have made them less willing than they would otherwise have been to cooperate with Canada now, when a major goal of our foreign policy is the establishment of a contractual link with the European Community.

Your Committee agrees with Mr. Cox that the lesson to be drawn from this comparison is not that Canada should necessarily remain in NORAD indefinitely. But if Canada were to decide that a different level of defence cooperation was desirable, careful attention would need to be given to the timing of its withdrawal from NORAD and the technique with which it was accomplished.

G. International Considerations

Your Committee believes that participation in NORAD is, and is seen by other countries as being, an integral element in Canada's over-all foreign policy. Because it is an exclusively North American organization, strictly defensive in nature and capability, NORAD's international profile is low. Nevertheless, it is seen by Canada's NATO allies and undoubtedly also by the Soviet Union, as making an important contribution to the protection of the United States strategic deterrent and hence to the stability of mutual deterrence. Though renewal of the Agreement would cause little international comment, a Canadian decision to withdraw from NORAD would be seen as significant. Unless accompanied by a substantial increase in Canada's defensive capability, such a decision would alarm our NATO allies, who value both the protection of the United States strategic deterrent and the solidarity of the Western alliance. Indeed, the NATO allies in Europe would interpret such a Canadian action as a second step in the process of withdrawal begun in 1969 and it would become an added obstacle to Canadian efforts to establish a separate link with the European Community.

Canadian withdrawal now would inevitably be seen in many parts of the world as a major blow to American policy at a time when the United States and the West generally have suffered a series of setbacks already. Quite apart from the value Canada places on the views of other countries, your Committee recognizes that Canada's own interests would be affected by a development which damaged the credibility of the United States.

Should Canada wish to alter the existing arrangement, these effects might be avoided or at least reduced in severity if a more propitious moment than the present were chosen, and if the decision were the subject of advance consultation and careful planning.

In light of this consideration, your Committee has examined the question of what positive international results might be achieved by withdrawal from NORAD. It has concluded that there would be none of significance. Any apparent increase in Canada's independence of the United States, as a result of withdrawal, would be more than offset in the eyes of other countries by the continuing economic interdependence and the obvious community of interests that exist between the two countries. For this and other reasons, your Committee agrees with Colin Gray that it is 'wishful thinking' to believe that there is "a third world eager to accept a neutralist Canada as its leader". This view was reinforced by Professor Cox, who argued that third world countries judge Canada's position less by NORAD than by its over-all strategic orientation and its economic position. On these grounds, your Committee considers it clear that Canada is and will remain firmly within the Western community of nations—whether or not it withdraws from the NORAD Agreement.

These international considerations regarding the future of NORAD demonstrate the proposition that, for Canada, military relations are usually more important for their political ramifications than for their military significance.

V. DURATION OF A RENEWED NORAD AGREEMENT

Mr. Richardson told your Committee that he would recommend renewal of the NORAD Agreement, either for a five-year period or for an indefinite period with a clause allowing either country to terminate the agreement on one year's notice. Of the two, Mr. Richardson said that he personally favoured an indefinite renewal, because it would demonstrate Canada's confidence in the continuing value of close defence cooperation with the United States, and would provide the continuity required for effective forward planning.

While recognizing the value of both these objectives, your Committee believes that a five-year extension of a seventeen year old agreement represents a significant expression of confidence in the value of cooperation. It also believes that the value of effective forward planning must be balanced against the need for reassessment of the most appropriate form of cooperation in changing circumstances. A decision will soon have to be taken regarding procurement of a new fighter interceptor. In addition, the new air defence regions should be in place along with the new radars serving civil and military functions. More should also be known about the effectiveness and cost of AWACS and other new surveillance and control systems, and about Soviet plans for deployment of the new Backfire.