

do this, if we can, by negotiating terms of peace, which will be honourable and will not be a betrayal of our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. We must not forget, however, that while one side can begin a war it takes both sides to end it. If negotiation is not possible, we have no alternative but to do our best to stabilize the military position, force the aggressor to pay as high a price as possible for his crime, avoid rash actions and words and unnecessary provocation in doing this, and hope that the Chinese Communists will soon desire to extricate themselves from a dangerous and costly adventure.

The safety of those who are fighting in Korea is a first consideration. It should be possible, however, to maintain our military position in Korea while keeping the door open for every possible opportunity to negotiate a settlement. This means refusing to be stampeded into action, such as a massive attack towards the Manchurian border, if such action were possible militarily but felt to be unwise politically. The chances for a settlement in Korea are also not increased by the kind of talk which weakens the unity of action of those who are participating in that operation.

There are, I think, two main threats to this unity of action. One is a feeling of impatience and even irritation in the United States, that, while they are bearing the brunt of the fighting, their friends in the United Nations do not give them sufficient backing, even at Lake Success. I think that we should recognize this feeling, just as we should gratefully recognize the special responsibility which the United States has accepted and the leadership it is giving in the struggle against Russian Communist imperialism. Such recognition carries with it the obligation to cooperate and to give support. But this support, if it is to have any value, does not mean an automatic response of "Ready, aye Ready" to everything that Washington proposes. It may mean constructive criticism of, and even opposition to, courses or proposals which we in Canada may think are unwise and concerning which it is our duty to express our views. I know that such criticism and opposition will be exploited by our Communist enemies for their own nefarious purposes. Because of this we should put forward our point of view, whenever we can, in private and try to persuade our friends as to its reasonableness. If we succeed, well and good. If we do not, we will have to decide whether to maintain our position in public or whether to abandon it because the acceptance of our viewpoint may not be so important as the maintenance of the united front.

The other danger to our free world unity arises when those who have been charged by the United Nations with military responsibility make controversial pronouncements which go far beyond that responsibility, and create confusion, disquiet and even discord. It seems to me to be as unwise, indeed as dangerous, for the generals to intervene in international policy matters as it would be for the diplomats to try to lay down military strategy. This is a case, I think, where the specialist should stick to his speciality. Otherwise, unnecessary difficulties are created, and that whole-hearted co-operation between friends which is so essential is hindered.

These difficulties are, I hope and believe, only chips off the block of unity. We should try to prevent them, of course, but they cannot destroy or even dangerously weaken the structure itself. Their greatest danger lies in