

Concerning Russett and Huth's paper, Milstein argued that one should be careful in making extrapolations from conventional to nuclear conflicts. He believed that "deterrence" had not developed a strategic meaning before the advent of nuclear weapons, and noted that it would be impossible to give examples of cases in which the onset of nuclear war provided a test of the effectiveness of deterrence. He also suggested that a crucial element in extended deterrence was whether or not it was requested by the protégé; some cases of extended deterrence might be part of an imperialistic plan.

Milstein categorically denied Dumas' assertion that there was any drug or alcohol problem in the Soviet nuclear strategic forces, though he could not make any such statement on the Soviet forces in general. He observed that many of the working conditions in the nuclear forces, such as secrecy and isolation, were found in other parts of the service.

He agreed with Dumas that the only way to avoid nuclear war is to abandon nuclear weapons, and repeated his citation of Gorbachev's proposal to rid the world of nuclear weapons in three stages, by the year 2000. He concluded that no matter how much command systems are improved, no matter how well nuclear force personnel are screened, or how well leaders are educated, as long as there are nuclear weapons there is a danger of nuclear war.

Russell Leng also provided a critique of Dumas' and Russett and Huth's papers. He believed that Dumas' work, while important, was still at the stage of forming hypotheses, and observed that Dumas based his conclusions on anecdotes rather than on a systematic statistical overview. This first stage of research would have to be fully completed before empirical research could go on to a second, statistical stage.

Leng-observed that Dumas' opinions converged with those of other researchers. He noted that Dumas' conference paper, the Russett/Huth paper and the work of some social psychologists all indicated that a firm-but-fair bargaining strategy is the best way to avoid war. Neither bullying nor appeasement are as effective. In addition, finding that the loser in one crisis is likely to be belligerent in the next crisis is particularly applicable to chronic crises such as those between India and Pakistan, Israel and Egypt, or the United States and the Soviet Union. This finding suggests that leaders get a progressively stronger message that they must play tough. Using different methods and analyzing different cases, researchers have come to markedly similar conclusions. Leng found statistical analyses exciting because they lead to similar conclusions even though they lack the spontaneous appeal of anecdotal works.

The presentation by Haag and de Seguin focussed on the French experience with nuclear weapons, and attempted to use that experience to illustrate some general points with regard to the command and control of nuclear forces. They began by pointing out that the problem of nuclear