

communist powers, the defenders.⁷⁸ Of the seven post-war cases they add to their 1988 collection, the United States is the challenger only in one, and the defender in two.

George and Smoke self-consciously limited their cases to those in which the United States saw itself as the defender. They did so to develop a critique of earlier theoretical and empirical research on deterrence which they rightly accuse of being apolitical, ahistorical, and theoretically unsophisticated.⁷⁹ Indeed, they argue explicitly that deterrence theory and strategy, as it was developed in the United States, was distorted by the context of the Cold War.⁸⁰ As they criticize other investigators for ignoring the ways in which the American practice of deterrence was rooted in the American historical experience, they would presumably be among the first to recognize the need to study the practice of deterrence by other states and the ways which it was conditioned by their national experience.⁸¹

The coding of cases is as badly affected by political bias as is their identification. Organski and Kugler code every one of their East-West confrontations in keeping with the traditional Cold War interpretation of these incidents. They express amazement and anger, for example, at how North Vietnam "defied the United States at every turn."⁸² Huth and Russett describe American policy in 1964 and 1965 as an unsuccessful attempt to prevent North Vietnam from attacking the South, an interpretation contradicted by the major scholarly treatments of this conflict.⁸³

⁷⁸ Huth and Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?." These cases are the United States (attacker) vs. North Korea (protege) and China (defender), 1950, and Turkey and the US (attackers) vs. Syria (protege) and the Soviet Union and Egypt (defenders), 1957.

⁷⁹ George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, pp.58-83, 88-97.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.553.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp.553-556.

⁸² Organski and Kugler, *The War Ledger*, pp.165, 167.

⁸³ George Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam* (New York: Knopf, 1986); Larry Berman, *Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam* (New York: Norton, 1982); David Halberstam, *The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam During the Kennedy Era*, revised edition (New York: Knopf, 1988).