

positive post-December policies for trying to get negotiations with the Soviet Union on a much more widespread basis. It seems to me that by historical accident we are left with three sets of negotiations which are described in the working paper in our folders, the INF, the START and the MBFR and that the very splicing of these negotiations into these three areas is itself a mechanism for slowing down the pace of negotiations, because so much of the negotiations are not actually negotiations at all, but arguments about definitions of different weapon systems and into which negotiations they ought to be. We ought to be looking beyond the present run of talks to the possibility of getting these pulled together, and I would argue that we ought to be giving much more political attention to the MBFR talks in Vienna. Because from the European point of view what we ought to be trying to do is to raise the nuclear threshold and so far in Europe we are behind the Soviet Union in conventional defence capabilities and that is one of the reasons why we are becoming overdependent on nuclear defence. The MBFR talks are in a sense, in my view, dragging on and on. We ought to be looking to the possibility of a Freeze as an opportunity for re-organizing the various forms of arms negotiations. Secondly, we in Britain and our colleagues in France cannot go on pretending that our independent missile systems should be kept ever out of the calculations. We may not actually want to put them into the negotiations in the sense of wanting them in the present run, but we cannot pretend that they can simply be ignored. For our part in the Liberal Party and the Alliance in Britain, we have opposed the Conservative Government's determination to go for a new generation of independent missile capability in purchasing the Trident system from the