

c. 17, we have just pointed out; but it would have the merit of being more statesmanlike and more worthy of the dignity of a legislative body, because it would be bringing into a succinct and accessible shape the whole statute law on this particular subject.

It appears to us that it would be a more scientific arrangement of the law if chapters 60 and 111 of the Revised Statutes had been combined; however, that is a point on which opinions may differ, according as the limitation of time for bringing actions to recover land is looked upon as a part of the law relating to realty, or a mere subdivision of the law relating to the bringing of actions.

CURRENT ENGLISH CASES.

The following cases are noted from the June numbers of the Law Reports and in consecutive order would follow the case of *National Telephone Co. v. Baker*, on page 476, *ante*.

WILL.—MORTGAGE.—EXONERATION OF LAND MORTGAGED FROM PAYMENT OF MORTGAGE DEBT—LOCKE KING'S ACT (17 & 18 VICT., c. 113)—(R.S.O., c. 109, s. 37).

In re Campbell, Campbell v. Campbell, (1893) 2 Ch. 206, is a decision of Kekewich, J., under Locke King's Act (R.S.O., c. 109, s. 37). The testator in his lifetime was entitled, subject to the interest of two life tenants, to a sum invested in consols. In order to get the principal money paid over to him by the trustees in whom it was vested, he executed a mortgage on his real estate in favour of the trustees to secure the due payment of the annuity of the two life tenants, and also for refunding the consols if ever required so to do by the trustees. The testator in his will recited the circumstances under which he expected to acquire the consols, and, subject to any charge he might have made on his real estate under the arrangement before referred to, he devised his land to certain uses, and his residuary personal estate in another way. After the testator's death the mortgaged estate was sold, and out of the proceeds the sum of consols was, on the requisition of the purchaser, reinvested in consols in the name of the trustee who had transferred it to the testator and the then surviving life tenant. The latter having subsequently