

give to the words of the draft resolution, the aim of which we have wholeheartedly approved from the beginning, but the wording of which, in one or two places, has raised some doubts as to its exact meaning.

I assume, for instance, and I hope that my assumption is correct, that the scrupulous observance of the 1949 Armistice Agreement which is called for in paragraph 2 of the second draft resolution, requires the two Governments concerned to refrain from all acts of hostility, including the exercise by either party of any claim to belligerent rights, specifically in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. My assumption on this point seems to me to be supported by the language of paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Secretary-General's report (A/3512), which refers to certain measures that should be carried out—and which, under paragraph 4 of this draft resolution, the Secretary-General is requested by this Assembly to carry out.

In regard to paragraph 3 of the second draft resolution, I take it that the word "other" in the phrase "the implementation of other measures" does not mean the exclusion of UNEF from these other measures by the fact that, under the preceding part of the paragraph, it is to be placed on the demarcation line. I also assume that the words "in the area" at the end of this paragraph include the Sharm el-Shaikh and Gaza areas as well as the area of the demarcation line.

These may seem small points, but many an important resolution—and this is a vitally important resolution—has been ruined by subsequent differences of interpretation and meaning of points which seemed to be small but turned out to be very large indeed, and very ambiguous.

#### Should Be No Doubt

I think it is especially necessary that there should be no doubt about the meaning of this resolution because if and when it is passed it becomes the Secretary-General's "Bible" as he undertakes the duties based on it.

Our attitude to resolution II, then, has been conditioned by the interpretation I have given above and we think this is a reasonable and acceptable interpretation. The actual authority given the Secretary-General to carry out the provisions of this resolution is to be found in paragraph 4 where he is requested to take steps to carry out the measures which are in his report, which has been before us for some time. In other words, he is to implement his report on the basis of this resolution. It seems to me desirable therefore to recall the measures which are to be carried out by him, because they will be his responsibility.

It seems to me that a careful reading of this report indicates that these measures—some of them would perhaps appear to be conclusions rather than measures—include the following:

First, full respect for, full implementation of and a reaffirmation of the Armistice Agreement of 1949 which remains in force and the

first article of which assimilates the agreement to a non-aggression pact providing for mutual and full abstention from belligerent acts;

Second, the restoration of the legal position of control in the Gaza strip and the recognition that any change in this position—a position which has practical and humanitarian as well as legal aspects—can only be brought about through a settlement between the parties. The Secretary-General recognizes that the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza on any wider basis than its deployment along the Armistice line in the Sinai Peninsula would require the consent of Egypt under the Armistice Agreement. He also points out, however, in his report—and I quote from that report—that "the development of the situation in Gaza may require special attention and may impose added responsibilities on the United Nations" in particular in regard to refugees.

The third measure from this report is the deployment of UNEF on both sides of the demarcation line, to prevent incursions and raids across that line.

Fourth, El Auja to be demilitarized in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and Israeli and Egyptian forces not to take positions in contravention of that agreement;

Fifth, the assumption by the Emergency Force of the supervisory duties of the Truce Supervisory Organization;

Sixth, formal assurance from the parties concerned to desist from raids and to take active measures to prevent incursions;

Seventh, pending determination of the legal position of these waters, innocent passage through the Straits of Iran and the Gulf of Aqaba in accordance with the recognized rules of international law, which passage is not to be interfered with by the exercise of any claim to belligerent rights;

The eighth and final measure which I have drawn from the report is that Israeli troops, on their withdrawal from the Sharm el-Shaikh area are to be followed by UNEF in the same way as in other parts of Sinai. The Force is not to be deployed there, as the Secretary-General points out, in such a way as to protect any special position on controversial questions, although, at least transitionally, it may function—or special United Nations observers may function—in support, and only in support, of mutual restraint and in maintaining quiet.

In these resolutions we are giving the United Nations Emergency Force very important functions in the pacification of the area. Perhaps it is already authorized to perform many of these functions. I agree, for instance, with the representative of Australia that in accepting the Secretary-General's second report on the establishment of the Emergency Force we have already, and with the consent of the Government of Egypt, authorized the Force to help maintain quiet after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops and to secure compliance with the