

Green<sup>18</sup> seemed impatient that we were not able to announce in concrete terms what we were going to do. It was during this discussion that Mr. Pouliot<sup>19</sup> made a somewhat ambiguous statement, the general effect of which was, however, that we should do nothing.

On Thursday evening, Mr. Howe, Mr. Claxton and I met you in your office at 11.30 p.m. when we discussed the whole matter. Mr. Claxton, Mr. Howe and I felt, as you will remember, that we should indicate that we were prepared to assist in terms of light naval forces, if the United Nations required such assistance. You felt strongly, and we agreed with you, that such assistance, if given, should only be in response to a request from the United Nations and in support of an operation authorized and sponsored by the United Nations.

On Friday morning at 10.00 o'clock we met again in your office when I produced a draft of the statement which, with amendments, was given by you in the House of Commons. This statement emphasized that our obligations were only those of a member of the United Nations, but pointed out that we were ordering certain destroyers into the Pacific so that we would be in a better position to fulfil those obligations, if developments made that desirable, in terms of naval support to United Nations activities in Korean waters. This statement received general support, and even Mr. Pouliot had nothing to say against it.

At 2.00 o'clock that afternoon the Security Council met and your statement was read as an indication of Canada's acceptance of the resolution of Tuesday.

Since Friday we have been very active, through Mr. Wrong in Washington and Mr. Holmes in Lake Success, in working out with the British and the Americans a formula which would make it clear that the operations being conducted in Korea are under the authority of the United Nations, exercised through a commander appointed by the United Nations. Discussions have also been going on as to the appointment of some United Nations Commission which would be the channel of communication from the commander to the United Nations in respect of policy questions and offers of assistance in this matter. This has been a difficult and complicated business. Constitutionally, the United States Government cannot put its forces under United Nations command, except as a result of military agreements concluded under Article 43. No such agreements, as you know, have been made, and in any event it would be difficult to invoke Article 43 without bringing the Russians in. We are getting over this difficulty by a resolution of the Security Council which would make it clear that, while military control and direction would have to remain under the United States commander on the spot, the acceptance by other United Nations participating of a unified command and the association of any forces given by those nations with that command, would be as a result of a United Nations decision.

We have made it abundantly clear in Washington that if Canada is to help, it must be help to the United Nations, fulfilling our obligations under the Charter, and

---

<sup>18</sup> Howard Green, député progressiste-conservateur de Vancouver Quadra.  
Howard Green, Progressive Conservative M.P. (Vancouver Quadra).

<sup>19</sup> Jean-François Pouliot, député libéral de Témiscouata.  
Jean-François Pouliot, Liberal M.P. (Témiscouata).