

naval reserve force for Canada, I may say that it is impossible within the limit of this paper to fully describe the various systems which are adopted by the different European countries. I cannot more than briefly give the result of my investigations. Great Britain is the only power who relies exclusively on volunteers. France and Germany demand the services of every able-bodied man between certain ages, to serve the country, either in the army or in the navy. For this reason both France and Germany have a reserve force of men largely in excess (proportionally with their requirements) of those of Great Britain. I shall, however, deal with the subject of the Royal Naval Reserve, as at present existing in England, because in any system which we may adopt for Canada we should have to see that it harmonizes with existing conditions within the empire.

In a paper which I read before the Canadian Military Institute about eight months ago, I drew attention to the fact that colonial seamen were excluded from enrolment in the Royal Naval Reserve. Through the press I have also agitated for an extension of the privileges to colonial seamen, pointing out the abundance of good material we have to draw from. It may be a coincidence, but I have recently received a copy of an act now before the British Parliament permitting the Admiralty to enroll men for the Royal Naval Reserve outside of the British Isles.

The present system of Royal Naval Reserve came into being in 1859. Until 1870 it was composed exclusively of men who had served in the mercantile marine, but since that time there has existed a second class, composed of men who are engaged in fishing, coasting, and other seafaring pursuits. Still later a third class, composed of boys of the mercantile trading ships, has been allowed: also a class of firemen.

In order to secure the services of Royal Naval Reservemen the British admiralty pay a premium to such officers and men who come up to the standard of qualifications laid down in the regulations, which will be found in the navy list. Both officers and men put in about a month's drill each year at whatever battery or naval reserve drill ship may happen to be convenient. It is impossible, within the limits of this paper, to give full details, but a careful consideration of the system leaves no room for doubt that it has many and grave defects.

Naval officers have stated to me that when naval reservemen come on board a man-of-war they have to be put among the idlers. Their qualifications as able seamen find no scope, for the modern fighting ship is mastless, and requires, in addition to the engine room force, only the men to direct the ship and operate the gun torpedo and electric armament. Their training is of little value for they have no permanent organization, no permanent officers whom they know and to whom they are accustomed. No uniform system of instruction has been given them, and the weapons with which they have been in the habit of going through their annual drill are mostly obsolete. The short periods of training with strange comrades, strange officers, varied weapons and unfamiliar surroundings, owing to their constantly changing the place at which they take their drill, cannot possibly give them the discipline and systematic way of performing their duties so necessary to the fighting efficiency of that complicated machine, the warship of the present day. The full strength of the corps can never be available on short notice, for it is much scattered, not only over the United Kingdom, but over the face of the world, and it would be a liberal estimate to state that within a fortnight after being called out not more than one-third of the enrolled strength could