being the ordinance of God appointed in that behalf; and it may not divest itself of any part of that sovereignty, but is bound, at all times, to exercise the whole of it, under its direct responsibility to God. Nor is this view of the supremacy of Church and State, each in its own sphere, attended with any practical difficulty; for the sanction with which each enforces its authority being not less different than their several spheres are distinct, both may fully vindicate their authority without the slightest risk of direct or injurious collision.

"The result of these principles is, that while it may be the duty of the Church and of the State to prompt and exhort, each of them the other, to the right discharge of its proper functions,—it must be equally incompetent for either of them to usurp authority, in any matter that falls under the peculiar province of the other;—so that neither may the State assert dominion over, or compel, the church, in the discharge of her appropriated spiritual functions, nor yet may the church compel the state, or resist its authority, in anything falling under its secular dominion. If the state, therefore approves of the church, it will confer upon her the endowments and other immunities of an Establishment; and the happy result of this concurrence between them will be eminently to promote the objects of both;—each party, however, still in its own province, remaining, of necessity, as free in reference to the other as before, and the church still proceeding unfettered in the exercise of her entire spiritual government. If, again, the state should disapprove of the church's proceedings,—it cannot, indeed, coerce or punish her in respect of her actings within the spiritual province,—but it may, if it thinks necessary, either wholly or partially, withdraw the endowments and immunities of the Establishment, (the disposal of which fall within its proper controul;) and the church is bound to submit to its determination in these matters, leaving, of course, the responsibility with the state, to whom it exclusively belongs."

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"This, accordingly, has been the view of the constitution taken by the civil courts, down to the present time. Thus, as early as 1735, the Court of Session adjudged that "the right to the stipend is a civil right; and therefore that the court have power to cognosce and determine upon the legality of the admission of ministers, to this effect,—whether the person admitted shall have a right to the stipend or not." And when, in 1749, the court was asked to interdict a Presbytery from proceeding to admit, as minister of a parish, another person than the patron's presentee, they unanimously refused,—"because that was interfering with the power of