

*External Affairs*

I remember last March during the election that the minister did not go nearly so far as insisting on inspection and control to accompany at least a temporary suspension of tests, and that was the position I myself took at that time. The reason I felt it would be possible at that time perhaps to agree to a temporary suspension of tests, with all the danger which now seems to be developing in the atmosphere as a result of the tests, is that I had read, and I have studied the matter a little, that there is no way by which you could violate an engagement of this kind not to explode nuclear missiles without having that violation detected by someone in another country. I have since been again told by very high scientific experts that such an engagement could not be violated without it being known.

Now that position seems to be changed. Indeed, while the Russians must take the main share of the responsibility for preventing an agreement, with inspection and control to go with it, the hon. minister must recall that only a few weeks ago there were some statements from Washington to the effect that even international control and inspection might not be ironclad enough to permit the United States government taking part in this kind of agreement, because it could be violated without any international control organization knowing anything about it. So it seems to have become a very confused situation, and those of us who felt that perhaps something could be done in Geneva to deal with this important and serious problem have some right to be discouraged.

Disarmament itself is bogged down worse than ever. Instead of having a United Nations disarmament sub-committee, which was a small group, Canada being one of the five, which could at least make some progress with regard to clearing away some of the technical underbrush as a result of all these discussions in the last two or three years, we now have a disarmament commission consisting of 82. We are not likely to make very much progress with a disarmament commission of 82. I know how difficult the matter is because it is tied up with political considerations. It seems to me that the only proposal for disarmament that made much sense in terms of its practical realization was one made by the prime minister of France, Edgar Faure, a few years ago, when he suggested that every country should agree to devote a percentage of its previous year's expenditure on armament to a great world development activity through the United Nations. This proposal, as he said, would be at least self-implementing to this extent,

[Mr. Pearson.]

that if you agreed to transfer 20 per cent of your previous defence budget to the United Nations or some international agency for development, you might cheat in regard to the amount of money which you spent on armament but you could not cheat on the 20 per cent turned over to the development authority. However, there have been a lot of other proposals which have not seemed to come to anything, and I do not think the outlook for the immediate future is very hopeful.

All these problems, and many others which I could touch on if I had time, are reflections, and some are rather sombre reflections, on what the minister called the east-west conflict. A basic reason for the conflict between communist imperialism and those countries who are determined to protect their free institutions, their democratic processes and their way of life against reactionary totalitarianism, is to my mind fear. I hope that the free people of this world are willing to pay the price in defence costs which are necessary in this situation and also in terms of an imaginative and flexible diplomacy, which is also a very important part of defence. But there is no doubt in the world, as I say, in my mind that one of the bases of this conflict is fear combined on one side, combined with a confident, at times a crusading, and an aggressive, ideology. The problem we face is the same problem we faced last year, the year before, and the year before that. It is how to break through this fear.

As we discuss this matter tonight, Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Macmillan are talking about this matter in Moscow. It is being talked about in Berlin, Paris, and in Washington. They are discussing conferences which might get these two sides together. So our minds inevitably go back to proposals for a conference at the summit between those men who have the destiny of the world largely in their hands. Yet as soon as one of these men proposes a conference, the three or four on the other side react against it because they are afraid of that proposal. That is true when the proposal comes from the western side, and you get the same reaction when it comes from the communist side.

What can we do about that? I have only one idea to put forward. This matter is certainly not the responsibility of the Canadian government, but it might be something perhaps in which the Canadian government would see some advantage if it were followed up. If there is to be a summit conference, as there will have to be one of these days, surely it must be convoked by someone and held in an atmosphere which does not arouse suspicion on either side. It seems to me there is one country and one man peculiarly