

beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. ...

"Regimes must be understood as something more than temporary arrangements that change with every shift in power or interest. ... The purpose of regimes is to facilitate agreements. ...

"It is the infusion of behaviour with principles and norms that distinguishes regime-governed activity in the international system from more conventional activity, guided exclusively by narrow calculations of interest." (pp. 186-187.)

More recent appreciations of the literature can be found in Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes" *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory" *World Politics*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1 (October 1986), Oran R. Young, "Politics of International Regime Formation" *International Organization*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), and Oran R. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation" *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991).

The most interesting recent exploration of regime theory in a security context is John S. Duffield, "NATO Force Levels and Regime Analysis," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Autumn 1992). The Duffield analysis, incidentally, is suggestive of the value that regime theory may hold for understanding confidence building, especially because of the role of cognitive processes in explaining participation in a security regime. Also see Roger K. Smith, "The Non-Proliferation Regime and International Relations," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Spring 1987). This treatment is also very useful in suggesting how regime analysis can be extended to the confidence building phenomenon.

14. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 7. This article presents an able (if necessarily simplified) discussion of contrasting views about international institutions (as understood by a committed realist) and is an excellent starting point for those interested in exploring this most important subject. Not surprisingly, those whose views

Mearsheimer claims to represent have taken exception to some of his characterizations. To gain a fuller understanding of these differing interpretations of institutions, see Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory"; Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security"; John Gerard Ruggie, "The False Promise of Realism"; Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics"; and Mearsheimer's reply, all in *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995). Also see Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995-96) for a continuing discussion of some of these issues.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 8. Mearsheimer quotes Krasner, *International Regimes* (special issue of *International Organization*).

16. Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," p. 82.

17. This is true for three main reasons. This reasoning is important and deserves repeating. First, conventional realist thinking tends not to pay much attention to the risks associated with competition and, instead, concentrates on the risks associated with cooperation. However, competition may be riskier than cooperation for a variety of sound reasons and, if this is recognized by policy makers, they will see a clear benefit in opting for cooperation (including using institutions or even developing them via approaches like confidence building). The key here is recognizing the relative gains that can occur under conditions of cooperation. Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 58-60.

Second, it is more accurate to evaluate security in terms of military capability than in terms of raw power. Military capability accommodates considerations of relative capacity (including offensive-defensive relationships) to perform important military missions (including effective ways of addressing the security dilemma). Cooperative policy options can, in some cases, improve a state's relative military capability more effectively than can purely competitive (unilateral) options. (*Ibid.*, pp. 60-67.) (The "security dilemma" refers to the tendency for improvements in offensive capability to inadvertently decrease security by triggering offsetting offensive counter-moves by an adversary that actually decrease the ability of the first state to