

anything possible prior to the space age. However, full utilization of this capability requires a large, well-trained and well-equipped staff for its data reduction and analysis, and a large data bank collected, stored and displayed using current technology. Indigenous development of both the physical equipment for collection and the organization for its analysis is beyond the capability of small nations. However, commercial organizations are beginning to offer for sale imagery of a very high quality.

The signing of multilateral arms control treaties has brought the need for their verification, and the process of confidence-building and the measures to combat proliferation have added other demands for collection of information and its assessment on a multinational, rather than a national basis. Moreover, many of the same capabilities that have made NTM so valuable for the gathering of intelligence are directly applicable to these new multinational requirements.

A number of plans have been offered for the creation of multilateral or global organizations to carry out such functions as the monitoring of disarmament, the verification of arms control agreements, or the general building of confidence, on a collective basis.<sup>1</sup> However, the recommended responsibilities do not extend as far as condemning violators or meting out punishments.

We have already seen reference in Chapter VII to "new" bodies (tasks) with which experiments have been made, but which have not become part of the daily lexicon. These include the "special" bodies established for a specific task, such as the UN Special Commission under Security Council Resolution 687 charged with the disarming of Iraq. During the past year we have also seen the establishment of UNOSOM II as the first UN-conducted peace enforcement operation (including a significant disarmament aspect). Finally, we have seen the Secretary-

General muse about using peace enforcement forces to deal with compulsory disarmament per se.

It is very difficult to imagine any of the foregoing in the future without a clear mandate from the Security Council, including the mobilization of the necessary political will to stay the course until success is achieved or the mandate changed. Provisions for enforcement must be written into the mandate.

With respect to differences between the roles and necessary composition of the various types of body, it is possible to foresee the "special commission type body" as dealing with problems involving high technology and thus requiring the necessary range of human and machine skills. When there is a large military aspect to the mission, such as disengagement, containment or disarmament, a "peace enforcement" mission would be required. The basic military skills, which are probably reasonably uniform among most countries, will be essential for execution of this type of mission. However, the use of a peace enforcement mission to assist in the implementation of an existing treaty or regime, as suggested by the Secretary-General, has not been tried as yet. If it is, effective co-operation among the personnel provided by different nations with different backgrounds in the roles of military and police in enforcing regulations in an unco-operative environment is likely to require a considerable degree of cross-national harmonization.

The prospect of establishing peace enforcement missions to compel the execution of internationally mandated disarmament raises sensitive questions of sovereignty and law. Depending on the specific task, implementation could require a mix of military and civilian specialists. Time will show whether states are willing to accept this enforcement approach. A possible test may be provided by the current situation in North Korea.

<sup>1</sup> An International Disarmament Organization was proposed in 1962 to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Later suggestions carried the names of Limited International Disarmament Organization (intended to co-ordinate the efforts of various verification groups) and International Verification Organization. A study undertaken by the UN General Assembly in 1990 produced little support for an integrated international multilateral verification system. However,

in 1993 the First Committee of the General Assembly recommended a review by a group of qualified governmental experts of the conclusions of the 1990 study, to seek ways in which "the United Nations might facilitate verification through relevant procedures, processes and bodies for acquiring, integrating and analyzing verification information from a variety of sources."

