

in the greater Europe. Open, pluralistic, democratic states with guarantees for individual rights and the development of market economies are the sole accepted standard.

The deeper question is what this dramatic change may mean for the conception and conduct of relations both within this widened "community" of European and North American states, and between them and all the others outside the "common European home". Will the Europeans and North Americans, and those other nations geographically removed but politically like-minded, find that the evaporation of their Communist common adversary merely liberates them further to pursue their divergent interests in a modified Hobbesian style, with only minimal Grotian restraints? The parlous state of the GATT and the open trading order and prosperity which depend upon it, would strongly suggest this possibility.

Will this community of states as a group, while nurturing and deepening their now-shared universalist values, view them as essentially messianic and seek actively to propagate them to the rest of the world? Or is this community of values to be content simply to co-exist and cooperate with others, under Grotian rules, unless threatened? Is it inevitable, on the other hand, that such co-existence of world-views will break down because of intolerance on one side or the other, or because the Grotian rules themselves may be, or come to be, viewed by "non-European" states as alien, imposed, and thus illegitimate?

At worst, there is a danger that this wider European community of states, plus perhaps, Japan and a few others, could come to view itself (or to be viewed by others) much as did the Christian international society or Christendom of the 15th to 17th centuries; as a narrower circle, bound by stricter rules for relations among themselves than the vaguer strictures of natural law which prevailed in their relations with others.⁸ The implications of such a philosophically, economically, and racially stratified international society being continued in an era of global communications are truly appalling to contemplate in a world of huge disparities, closer interdependence, and proliferating security threats.

This scenario is not inevitable, but its avoidance will demand far more coherent and far-reaching strategies than have ever been applied in the past. It can be argued that some of the basic values that have finally prevailed in the East-West competition have also, for a variety of reasons, won very broad acceptance in the rest of the world. In many ways, however, the moral and political vulnerability of Western standards of order to the charge of double standards is much greater in