

7. Reassurance is more likely to succeed when an adversary is driven largely by domestic political needs and/or strategic weakness.
8. Reassurance is likely to encourage the challenge it is designed to prevent when an adversary is motivated primarily by opportunity.
9. When adversarial motives are mixed, reassurance and deterrence are more likely to succeed when practised in tandem.

The hypothesized synergism between deterrence and reassurance raises further interesting research questions. It is reasonable to suppose that there are important relationships between immediate and general reassurance and between deterrence and reassurance at all levels. Analysis of these relationships would promote a better understanding of the dynamics of both deterrence and reassurance as strategies of international conflict management.

(4) *Perception and context*

Deterrence theory specifies as mutually exclusive the roles of challenger and defender and further assumes that their identification in any deterrence encounter is obvious to adversarial leaders and analysts alike. But case studies indicate that neither assumption is warranted. As we observed in the Cuban missile crisis, both the Soviet Union and the United States perceived themselves to be the defender. This pattern of overlapping perception appears widespread in deterrence encounters and almost certainly has significant implications for the behaviour of the parties.

The roles of challenger and defender, even when distinct and mutually clear, are divorced by deterrence theory from the political context in which a challenge occurs. Leaders who see themselves as challengers may simultaneously believe that their action is justified by important legitimate and defensive interests.¹³⁹ Egypt in 1973,

¹³⁹ Paul Stern, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis, and Roy Radnor examine the impact of perceptions of legitimacy on the outcome of deterrence in their "Conclusions," in *Perspectives on Deterrence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.294-321.