

Differences remained over range specifications and whether or not to include non-nuclear SLCMs in the agreement, as desired by the Soviets.²

The USSR conceded to the US position regarding ALCMs after being reassured that the Americans would make a commitment that the actual number of ALCMs carried by a bomber would not exceed a certain unspecified number. The Soviet concession meant that in START, US strategic bombers capable of carrying up to twenty cruise missiles would be counted as carrying only ten, while Soviet bombers capable of carrying a dozen or more would be counted as carrying just eight. The Soviets would be allowed forty percent more ALCM-equipped bombers to offset the greater number of missiles permitted on each American bomber.³ Differences over ALCM ranges were not solved, and the two sides still disagreed about how to ensure that conventionally armed cruise missiles would be exempt.

The two sides also agreed on the outline of a treaty provision specifying that missile telemetry would not be encoded, in order to allow for interception by the other side. However, the US insisted on preserving the right to omit key technical parameters, so that Moscow would remain in the dark about some of the data it intercepts. Moscow's preference was for all data to be transmitted in a clear and readily understood manner.

On 5 and 6 April 1990, Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze met in Washington in an effort to clear away the remaining obstacles to a START agreement, among other things. Other than the announcement that the US-Soviet Summit would take place from 30 May to 3 June, little headway was made. In fact, the Soviets seemed to go back on the SLCM agreement reached in February. Now they insisted that assurances on the size of the SLCM force of each side had to be codified in the treaty. Mr. Shevardnadze also asked the US to commit itself to follow-on strategic nuclear arms negotiations immediately upon completion of a START treaty, prior to Senate ratification. The Americans refused to make such a commitment pending the outcome of the ratification process and a discussion of what arms would be included in any "START II."⁴

Immediately after the Baker-Shevardnadze meetings it was revealed that the two sides had discussed a plan, secretly and informally put forward by the US the month before, for banning all land-based multiple-warhead missiles. Under the plan, a ban on *mobile* land-based missiles with more than one warhead would be included in an initial START agreement. In a follow-on agreement, to be negotiated after the current talks were completed, all land-based, multiple-warhead missiles would be eliminated. In a letter delivered to Bush from Gorbachev by Shevardnadze on 6 April the Soviet leader countered that any ban on multiple-warhead missiles

² Michael R. Gordon, "US and Soviets Appear to Agree on Main Elements of Arms Treaty." *New York Times*, 11 February 1990, pp. A1 and A20. *Arms Control Reporter* (1990), p. 611.B.613.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 611.B.614.

⁴ Don Oberdorfer and R. Jeffrey Smith, "US-Soviet Summit Dates Advanced." *Washington Post*, 6 April 1990, p. A1.