conclusions of the meeting was the need to persuade non-Commonwealth countries (especially Japan and West Germany) to imitate Commonwealth sanctions is perhaps evidence that, lacking global agreement, economic sanctions are unlikely to have a significant effect on South African policies. Even then, means of enforcing such measures would need to be put in place (the mandatory arms embargo imposed by the Security Council in 1977 has been violated with apparent ease).

The Canadian Government is sensitive to these hard realities. Mr. Clark told the House of Commons in March that "since Canada's trade is less than one percent of South Africa's total trade, our action is more effective when it is in concert with, or as catalyst to, actions by nations whose economic impact is greater." With the exception of the United States, South Africa's major trading partners have not so acted. Nevertheless, Canada announced several new measures in September to tighten sanctions, as well as new help for anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa. The latter, Mr. Clark has said, are a major reason for keeping diplomatic relations with South Africa; without such relations it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to disburse the some $3 million a year that Canada gives to these organizations. "So long as we feel we are being effective, we will be there" (Clark, 16 August).

Both opposition Parties and forty-one percent of the public (according to an August poll) support stronger sanctions. Few, if any, important domestic interests are involved in the issue, given the paucity of Canadian aid and trade links with South Africa. The Government, therefore, is relatively free to move ahead with sanctions if it believes that further action is required. It is also committed to do so if the situation in South Africa does not