


General Dynamics' F-16 (Canadian version CF-16).



McDonnell Douglas' F-18A (Canadian version CF-18A).

tems over the life span of the aircraft.

The two most severe constraints that we face, and will continue to face, are the number of aircraft required and the set amount of money to buy them. Our task, then, is to buy the best military aircraft available within those constraints, while seeking the best possible industrial benefits with a minimum of project risk.

#### Suitability

In addition to cost and numbers, there are other considerations that serve to favour the two aircraft we have kept in the process. To begin with, there is the military and political assessment that we have made of the current — and to a certain extent, anticipated — strategic situation that we are facing.

We have come to the conclusion that an adequate number of the smaller aircraft equipped with radar guided air-to-air missiles and suitably deployed across Canada, could afford us the capability to exercise our sovereignty fully by intercepting, identifying, and if necessary, destroying aircraft that might be probing into Canadian airspace. Having this type of prudent capability, we believe, would deter probes and offer adequate protection against the possibility of a bomber attack on the North American continent.

Having eliminated the three most expensive systems from the competition, three remained — the *CF-16*, the *CF-18A* and the *CF-18L* — that met or came very close to meeting our numerical requirements within the budgetary envelope while being able to meet the most likely military challenges.

The *CF-18L* proposed by Northrop could meet these most likely challenges and probably be acquired in sufficient quantities. Potentially, it also provides a

very attractive package of industrial benefits. However, we have assessed as very considerable the risk of committing Canada to buying a sophisticated aircraft that is not in service with any other country. At this time, I consider all the various types of risk which could be involved in the development and initial introduction into operational service of this aircraft are greater than we either need or are prepared to accept. Moreover, even in the best of circumstances, the delivery schedule of the *CF-18L* is likely to be markedly behind that required for the timely replacement of our *CF-101* and *CF-104* aircraft.

#### Pros and cons

The *CF-16* is a single-engine aircraft which has been selected by five of our NATO allies, including the United States. Should the *CF-16* be acquired, Canada would of course have extensive commonality with NATO allies in Europe. While this aircraft does not have the degree of sophistication of the larger aircraft, it does have acceptable capability and is the only aircraft which at this point meets the numbers required.

The other fighter remaining in the competition, the *CF-18A*, offers us another set of possibilities. It may be more expensive than the *CF-16* would be; therefore we can expect to acquire fewer, although I am optimistic that an adequate number to meet our rules can be acquired in negotiations. Purchase of this aircraft could allow for co-operative logistics arrangements with the United States.

On the other hand, being a twin-engined, somewhat larger aircraft, the *CF-18A* offers some definite advantages of its own. These include a good potential for growth, or a capability to be fitted

with new systems that may be necessary to cater to future demands made of a fighter aircraft. The *CF-18A* also currently has more advanced all-weather capabilities in the context of sovereignty protection and air defence.

We must recognize, however, that in both military and political terms, a major consideration for Canada is collective security in Europe. This is where the philosophy, or strategy, of deterrence, common to all members of the NATO alliance, is subject to its greatest challenge, in the light of qualitative and quantitative improvements to the forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.

It is important that our own contributions to collective security be quantitatively and qualitatively adequate for deterrence. Quantitatively, this means a number of aircraft at least equal to that we now commit to the alliance in central Europe and to the northern flank. This total number of aircraft, plus some for training and attrition, makes up well over half of our total requirement. This is clearly a factor that influences the type of capability that we must seek in the fleet, the qualitative aspect of the contribution. We want that capability to be prudently adequate for the sovereignty and air defence roles in Canada and also to be effective in particular roles in central Europe and in northern Norway.

As you can appreciate, there are pros and cons to both types of aircraft. I can assure you that there were also some pros and cons to all aircraft that have now been eliminated. Our request for proposal provided a standard which enabled us to obtain truly comparable data for all contenders. No single aircraft could possibly have met all specifications given in

(Continued on P. 8)