

be specified in these few pages; but any one may easily ascertain them by tracing out, under the guidance of his own reason, the natural consequences of such *other* arrangement; or by noticing its actual results in those countries where it is now in operation. The existence, within the territories of a single nation, of a multiplicity of laws—each having a distinct local application—upon almost every question of human rights; and of a plurality of courts—each peculiarly constituted and having its peculiar rules of practice—administering those laws; must, in any case, hamper the ordinary administration of justice, promote the growth of crime, and seriously inconvenience commercial intercourse between the various parts of those territories. In proportion as those territories are geographically near to each other, and as they are alike in climate, natural productions, and the social condition of their inhabitants, those evils will be multiplied and more keenly felt. In fact, one of the principal reasons why a Union of the Provinces is desirable, is that it may remove those evils from them. It does not very materially affect the result that the differences in laws, or in the administration of them, are only slight: that there is a difference at all, is what makes the difficulty. But the natural consequence of independent local legislation, is to make those differences greater and more numerous. This kind of legislation has the additional evil effect of cherishing those local prejudices, and feelings of separate interests which, as already observed, tend so decidedly to the estrangement of each member of a Confederation from its fellows.

It may be argued against the validity of these objections to the Federal form of Government generally, that the rapid increase in power, wealth, and general prosperity which has taken place in the great Confederation of the United States of America, proves them to be not well founded. It is no part of the object of these remarks to reason, or to speculate, upon the probable future of that republic. It may, however, be observed generally that because the United States have grown so rapidly, under a Federal Constitution, it does not, by any

means, follow that such of the peculiarities of that Constitution as are above indicated, have no evil effect. As well might it be argued—as, indeed, it often and vainly has been—that because, under a system of high protective duties, Great Britain rose to the position of first nation on earth, in power, wealth, and prosperity; therefore such a system must be a sound one, and should not have been abolished. The United States have become great and prosperous in spite of the causes alluded to, not in consequence of them. It might, with much more propriety, be argued, that the Federal Constitution of the United States furnished a reason why that republic has not, as already shown, grown in the same ratio as the British North American Provinces.

That the last of the objections urged against Federal Governments is found to be a real objection, in the United States, few persons acquainted with that country will pretend to dispute. As to the argument that Federal institutions tend to the political debility and dissolution of the Union wherein they exist, there is nothing to be found in the history, or present condition, of those States relative to each other, to controvert it. The partial success which has attended the working of the Federal Constitution, in that republic, has been mainly owing, not to any special virtue in the Constitution itself, but to the peculiar circumstances and feelings of the people—already alluded to—which led, in the first place, to the adoption of that Constitution. But notwithstanding the favorable feeling of the people towards it, and their sense of the necessity of conforming to its provisions, at the outset, frequent examples of the mutual jealousies of the States, of the injuries they inflict upon each other, and of the inability of the Federal Government to reduce to obedience any one of them which may evince a spirit of insubordination are to be found in the history of that Confederation. As notorious and flagrant instances of this latter manifestation of weakness, may be cited the refusal of the Eastern States, during the war of 1812, to furnish, in obedience to the Federal Government and in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution, their contingent of militia to aid in