

Islands. Presuming on this, the Pope made an ineffectual attempt in 1886 to interfere in the internal political arrangements of Germany. And although in 1888 the Emperor William II visited the Vatican, the Pope found that not all the caresses he could lavish on the imperial visitor would cause him to depart from a "deplorable recognition of accomplished facts."

Towards the government of the Czar, the political suppleness of the Pope exposed him to the discontent of his most faithful ally—the Austrian government. But Austria itself would not accede to his views being bound by the obligations of the Triple Alliance to respect the prerogatives of the King of Italy—who alone is sovereign not only throughout Italy but in the city of Rome. The most that could be gained on this by the Pope was the declaration in 1892 of the Austrian minister Kalnosky in regard to the disputed papal sovereignty in Italy, that it "is always an open question." This response provoked a lively feeling of indignation (as might be expected) among Italian patriots and royalists.

Nothing could be hoped from the British monarchy, or from those other small Protestant monarchies of Scandinavia in regard to restoring the Pope's sovereignty in Italy, or recognizing it even as a *de jure* quality; or recognizing even as a *de jure* quality; for, in fact, it never was *de jure*; not even Charlemagne would recognize that as his conference with the court of Constantinople over the head of Pope Leo III shows. Papal sovereignty in Italy had been built up on the overthrow of the Romano-Germanic empire of the Hohenstauffens; on national weakness and corruption resulting from the squabbles of the Italian Republics of the Middle Ages, re-enforced by the authority of religious excommunication to those who disputed it after they had borne the test of the dreaded interrogations of the inquisition. When finally from discord, corruption and tyranny, the Sardinian King Victor Emmanuel, aided by Cavour in state craft and Garibaldi in arms, had rescued the fragments of the dismembered Italian States, and in spite of Austria on the one hand, Spain on the other, and the Pope in the Centre, had welded Italian nationality into monarchy and unity, liberty and progress—the result was too strong and too edifying to be overthrown, as any other Italian subject, no more political power in Italy, faded away forever. It was to secure a recognition of

this and its restoration that had prompted all the complaisance of Leo XIII, among those courts of Europe deemed most likely to give a favoring response. So far as his direct communication with the Italian monarchy goes—a monarchy that had declared to his predecessor Pius IX that there never could be two sovereigns in Italy, and that politically, the Pope had just the same rights and privileges as any other Vatican subject, no more nor less—he always spoke of it as "painful for the church, intolerable for the papacy." He maintained that while the interests of the church are sacred, the temporal rights of the Holy See are imprescriptible, although disgracefully violated.

Strong in his desire, the desire of every Pope, to regain temporal power and recognition as a temporal sovereign at any cost, the treatment of the Catholic party in France by Leo XIII has been remarkable in two particulars and has proven his policy to be that of an "opportunist." These two particulars are (1) a direct departure from the political expectation and aspirations of the French Catholics who desire the restoration of the monarchy in France and from the policy of previous Popes, and in direct political contradiction of his professions in dealing with the strong monarchies of Europe. In fact, in order to conciliate the French Republic, so as to convert it to a less severe regard of the church, Leo XIII destroyed the monarchical programme in France. During the first twenty years of the republic, the monarchical party had had the adhesion of the prelates and the support of the clergy. Because of this strength, which united the country districts under the banners of the nobility for the restoration of the legitimate monarchy in France, the republicans took alarm and out of revenge their chief, the demagogue Gambetta, pronounced the war cry: "Down with clericalism, that is the enemy." Frightened by this, Leo XIII patted the French Republic on the back, deserted his friends in France, the Catholic party, and gave the signal in 1891 to Cardinal Laviegrerie to promise support of the church to the usurping republicans of France. A great cry of astonishment and indignation went up at the time from all the Catholic people of France, and brought protests from the most influential of the Pope's own colleagues against this political move. But the whole availed nothing, for in the following February the Pope published an encyclical recognizing the republic and commanding the French