

tional defence, while the U.S. assisted with conventional forces and a nuclear "back-stop", both tactical and strategic. The only trouble with this theory was that it was a war-fighting strategy designed to minimize U.S. casualties if war broke out whereas the Western Europeans preferred a war-preventing strategy. As far as the Western Europeans were concerned, a prolonged conventional defence of Western Europe would be nearly as devastating as an earlier tactical nuclear exchange. Most Western Europeans doubted the accuracy of McNamara's calculations of NATO parity or superiority *vis à vis* the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) and argued that, even if Western Europe could field conventional forces equal to those of the WPO, this would only create an illusion of Western European strategic partnership with the U.S. The U.S. would retain control over the tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. This control was essential both to the ultimate deterrence of a Russian threat of attack and to the use of military superiority to extract political advantages.

Paradoxically, the Western European insistence on strategic dependence on the U.S. provided a more realistic basis for assessing the strategic relationship between Western Europe and the U.S. than McNamara's theories of equality, which paralleled the Atlanticist notion of a "dumb-bell" partnership, with a united Europe sharing the American burden of being a global policeman. The dumb-bell notion has always obscured the central reality that it would be the U.S. half of the dumb-bell which would retain the strategic nuclear striking power on which the Western European half would continue to depend for its security. In addition, as Kissinger himself pointed out (in *The Troubled Partnership*, McGraw-Hill, 1965), attempts to remedy this fundamental imbalance led to technological solutions, like the ill-fated Multilateral Nuclear Force, for political problems. The Western European response to the notion that NATO forces were more powerful or WPO forces less powerful or both was to cut defence spending. This trend was encouraged by the Harmel Report of 1967, which, by urging NATO to become an instrument of *détente*, belatedly formalized NATO acceptance of *détente*. Similarly, the NATO suggestion for talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) made at Reykjavik in 1968 was motivated by two desires: (1) to cut defence spending and keep U.S. forces in Western Europe; (2) to prevent U.S. unilateral force reductions. Despite subsequent developments (see articles by Legault and

Ranger in *International Perspectives*), these two motives remained the basis of Western European attitudes towards MBFR.

Ironically, considering the amount of attention Dr. Kissinger had devoted to the problems of the Western Europe-U.S. relationship in NATO before assuming office first as President Nixon's Special Assistant for National Security (1968-1973) and then as Secretary of State, he tended to take the NATO relationship for granted. Though apparently favourable towards the British and French independent nuclear deterrents, and sympathetic towards the fears of total dependence on the U.S. nuclear guarantee that had led to their construction, he made no great effort to secure greater nuclear co-operation between the three nuclear powers in the Western alliance. Ideas of French-British nuclear co-operation evident in the early 1970s fell on stony ground, leaving the EEC strategically dependent on the U.S.

This dependence was increased by domestic pressures in Western Europe (and the U.S.) for reductions in defence spending, which always meant in conventional forces. These reductions increased NATO's reliance on the early use of tactical nuclear weapons (within two to ten days of a major Soviet attack) in demonstrative strikes, and have led to pressure for the introduction of "mini-nukes" (very small tactical nuclear weapons with little radioactive fallout) to augment the firepower of U.S. and NATO forces. But the "mini-nukes" would still be under U.S. control, as are all nuclear weapons supplied to the NATO allies. So not only was the EEC strategically dependent on the U.S. but the Community felt strategically dependent on it. Because of this feeling of dependence, the Community hated to be reminded of the realities of its strategic position. Further evidence of this strategic bipolarity, with the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. still dominant in a politically multipolar world, came with the Vladivostok Agreements of 1974.

#### Vladivostok Agreements

For the EEC these agreements of November 24, 1974, had two meanings. First, the super-powers had rejected technical arms control (that is, measures effectively limiting the development and deployment of new weapons systems) in favour of political arms control (that is, an agreement by the super-powers to insulate the strategic arms acquisition process from their political relations). This meant that strategic bipolarity would increase rather than

*Kissinger took NATO relationship for granted*

*Feeling of strategic dependency*