## OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

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that of the particular system examined in this chapter. . And yet writers on logic have been all but unanimous in their assertion, not merely of the supremacy, but of the universal sufficiency of syllogistic inference in deductive reasoning." These statements, that conversion and syllogism are branches of a much more general process, have of course no meaning except on the supposition that the "much more general process" is not reducible to conversion and syllogism. If reducible to these, it would not be a more general process. Now we take our stand firmly on the position, that a chain of valid reasoning, which cannot be broken into parts, every one of which shall be an instance either of conversion or of syllogism, is not possible. We are prepared to show this in the case of every one of the examples of his "more general process" which Professor Boole gives in his work. Nay, we go farther, and as was intimated above, hold it to be absolutely demonstrable, that, from the nature of the case, inference cannot be of any other description than conversion or syllogism.

To make this out, let it be remarked that the conclusion of an argument exhibits a relation between two terms, say X and Y. It is an important assumption in Professor Boole's doctrine, that a proposition may exhibit a relation between many terms. This is not exactly true. A proposition may involve a relation between a variety of terms implicitly; but explicitly exhibits a relation only between two. Take, for instance, the proposition-" Men who do not possess courage and practise self-denial are not heroes." Here, on Professor Boole's method, a variety of concepts are supposed to be before the mind, as, men, those who practise self-denial, those who possess courage, and heroes. But in reality, when we form the judgment expressed in the proposition given, the separate concepts, men, those who practise self-denial, those who possess courage, are not before the mind; but simply the two concepts, men who do not possess courage and practise self-denial, and heroes. What is a judgment but an act of comparison? And the comparison is essentially a comparison of two concepts, each of which may no doubt involve in its expression a plurality of concepts, but these necessarily bound together by the comparing mind into a unity. Now, if the conclusion of an argument exhibits a relation between two terms X and Y, this conclusion must be drawn (what other way is possible?) either through an immediate comparison of X and Y with one another, or by a mediate comparison of them through something else. If it be drawn by an

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