

I have tried to state some of the difficulties still inherent in the control problem, and to state them frankly, because I believe with Mr. Lloyd that this is the crux of our problem. When the Anglo-French and Soviet proposals are considered in greater detail, I think we shall find that if agreement on control can be achieved, the other aspects of the problem will all fall into place. I would, however, agree with Mr. Vyshinsky when he said that there was "no insuperable contradiction" between the two positions. I well remember that in the Korean debate, when we thought we had reached the end, Mr. Vyshinsky, in that amiable way which is his alone, said he did not think we should conclude that there was no hope in the matter. I felt yesterday, when he said there was no insuperable contradiction, that it may be that this debate will usher in a real and serious agreement on this important question.

The creation of adequate and authoritative machinery for inspection and control of disarmament is not -- let it be clear -- any more disturbing to Soviet interests than to the interests of any other country, because there are very unusual steps proposed in the kind of control we are talking about in so far as the integrity of national governments is concerned. The Governments of the Western Powers have proposed only what they themselves are prepared to accept in their own countries. Mistrust is not the exclusive property of one or the other side of the Iron Curtain. A prerequisite of any disarmament system is certainly that no State should have cause to fear that its security would be endangered by the operation of the control system or by any other feature of the programme, and this is indicated in the draft resolution which stands in the name of my country.

If we are to have serious and informal examination of the Anglo-French and the Soviet proposals, and all other proposals which may have been or may be submitted, then I think we must all agree that upon the conclusion of the disarmament debate in this Committee, which I think and would urge should be extensive and thorough, there should be an early opportunity for the further examination of the problem by a smaller group. For the reasons I have already given, my delegation believes that the most appropriate group for this purpose would be the Disarmament Commission's Sub-Committee where the Anglo-French proposals, now accepted by the Soviet Union as a basis were presented.

There is an obvious similarity between the procedure which I am suggesting and the suggestions made yesterday by the representative of the Philippines, and I want the representative of the Philippines to know that I tried to see him earlier this morning when I learned that his draft resolution had likewise been tabled. The essential point in common is that both of us see every advantage in providing a framework for detailed and confidential discussion between those Governments which have been principally involved in this topic, in order to see whether differences cannot be thrashed out in the quieter and more intimate atmosphere of small closed meetings. Small closed meetings have the advantage, in difficult and vital negotiations, that they take place away from the glare of publicity and free, therefore, from the constant temptation to speak at least as much for the benefit of public opinion in various key areas of the world as to clarify and persuade one's associates in negotiation.