

That deterrent force is being built and will be maintained so long as it is necessary. As our contribution to it, since the autumn of 1951, the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade has been stationed in Western Europe. Twenty-four ships of the Canadian Navy have been made available to the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. These will be increased until by 1954 they will number 52. Twelve jet-fighter squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force - an Air Division - part of which is already overseas - will be stationed in Europe by next year.

We are also making a substantial contribution to NATO in the form of mutual aid to our allies and partners. Increasing amounts have been made available in each budget since September 1950, and the appropriation for the current financial year amounts to about 325 million dollars. These appropriations provide for transfers of equipment, the training of air crew of our other NATO partners, and other material aid where it is needed.

NATO, however, is more than a military alliance against aggression. While it came into being because it was found that the United Nations was powerless at that time to provide the security we sought, it rests on foundations more durable than military strength alone. The force which unites the communities of the North Atlantic area is not only a common danger; it is also a common history and a common tradition of freedom. To achieve our aims, economic and political stability must co-exist with military strength, for military strength bought at the expense of economic or political stability is illusory.

Thus, from the outset, Canadian policy has aimed at ensuring that NATO should promote co-operation and progress in areas outside the purely military sphere. Progress in these areas has been disappointingly slow. We hope that it is, however, sure. We realize that it must grow from within, and cannot, with success, be forced into any pre-conceived pattern. Its existence will not necessarily be hastened by the establishment of new machinery or institutions for carrying out what we may be able, even now, to recognize as the ultimate scope of the Atlantic community. Progress will depend upon the growth of mutual confidence and understanding, rather than on procedures or committees. But progress in this field there must be, if NATO is to survive the emergency which gave it birth. ...

In Canada, we have not forgotten that we share with the United States and fifty-eight other countries common membership in the United Nations. We continue to support the aims and purposes inscribed in its Charter.

The principles of general collective security - and general collective welfare - remain the basis of our foreign policy. We are convinced - Korea is the proof, - that aggression in any part of the world constitutes, in the long run, a threat to every other part. Our acceptance of this principle, however - or at any rate its application in practice - is qualified, as are so many things, by the available resources of the free world. To say we must use judgment in deciding how the collective security obligations of the Charter can best be discharged does not mean that we can turn a blind eye to any act of aggression. It does mean, however, that those who share the responsibility of defending the free world must exercise the highest qualities of patience, intelligence, and conscience, in deciding where and how the limited forces at our disposal should be applied.